The Foreign Service Journal, April 2009

24 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / A P R I L 2 0 0 9 NATO’s International Security Assistance Force is laboring in this intrinsically difficult territory under several extrinsic burdens. Its overall strategy and objectives have been unclear and difficult to explain to al- lied publics. Until recently, a di- vided chain of command reduced operational effectiveness. Differences on aid programs, methods for dealing with poppy production, lack of coordination and other unresolved questions about political and economic development have all hin- dered the non-military aspects of NATO’s efforts, so crit- ical in a campaign like this one. And the United States, whose leadership was central to NATO at every stage of its military history, has been distracted by its simulta- neous war in Iraq. But for those concerned about NATO’s continued vi- ability, the greatest internal problem has been the re- fusal of some allies to take on the same risks as others. The restrictions on ISAF operations imposed by such al- lies as Germany and Italy has, in effect, created a two- tier alliance, something military planners worked hard to avoid throughout the Cold War. This division is es- pecially damaging because some of the allies with the smallest potential to contribute have nonetheless done so without reservations, while some with the greatest po- tential have opted out of the most difficult and danger- ous operations. The result has been not just resentment, but real questions about the very meaning of the term “alliance.” When some members accept greater risk than others, questions inevitably arise as to what it means that an “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” Certainly, Article 5 leaves latitude for each ally to determine its own appropriate response, and the war in Afghanistan was not undertaken as an Article 5 op- eration under NATO command. But the fact that NATO’s most significant military operation has created ambiguity surrounding various allies’ willingness to un- dertake dangerous missions, even against regimes as brutal as the Taliban, has a corrosive effect that may be lasting. If the ISAF’s difficulties in Afghanistan were simply a matter of the friction that attends coordi- nation among 26 (soon to be 28) bureaucracies, the problems would be vexing but not catastrophic. Such problems of process and me- chanics have always existed, and they have always slowed progress. Indeed, they are explainable as the “cost of doing business” through an organization that operates on the principle of consensus, reporting to capitals that are each accountable to pluralistic political systems. The Danger of Divergence But they are still messy, and that messiness can carry serious consequences. The problems of coordination in NATO’s 1999 Kosovo campaign convinced some Bush administration officials that NATO could not be relied upon in actual conflict situations. Afghanistan, however, represents what may be a different level of difficulty and divergence. Some governments — for example, the Netherlands, Great Britain and Canada (as well as many of the Cen- tral European allies) — have been able to sustain a com- mitment to the more dangerous work NATO has undertaken. Others, especially Germany and Italy, have not done so (though they have lost lives and expended treasure in their Afghan missions). The inability or un- willingness of those countries to commit to greater risk has transcended particular governments and operates even under avowedly pro-American leaders. That fact suggests that in those countries, at least, there are broad objections to taking on the more dangerous tasks of the war. So Americans are entitled to wonder: If the Taliban regime and al-Qaida are not morally and practically worth opposing with military action, what enemy would qualify for united NATO action? Doubts on this score seem to suggest a basic divergence over what constitutes good and evil, and whether any regime is worth risking life to oppose. Former German Ambassador to the United States Wolfgang Ischinger confirmed a gap in beliefs on this point, but took a more hopeful tone when reacting to F O C U S Initially sidelined in Afghanistan, the Alliance is now trying to find a way forward there under increasingly difficult circumstances.