The Foreign Service Journal, April 2009

26 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / A P R I L 2 0 0 9 bership. But none of the countries admitted during the post–ColdWar enlargement of NATO were ready for the responsibilities of member- ship when they entered the MAP process. Indeed, MAP presumes that the candidate has work to do. Moreover, as the candidate nation takes on that work, it does not par- ticipate in the Article 5 commitment to mutual defense. There was thus no possibility that a different decision a year ago would have obliged Germany or any other ally to defend a country that was not ready to be a member, mil- itarily or politically. The real concern for Germany and France seems to have been Russian objections to even the possibility that Georgia and Ukraine might eventually become NATO members. Indeed, Amb. Ischinger himself noted, again in February, that “We have promoted NATO enlargement in a one-sided fashion and have tolerated the erosion of our relationship with Russia.” In line with such an approach, Chancellor Merkel de- clined a direct request by President George W. Bush to extend MAP to Ukraine and Georgia, a historic rejection of American leadership on a key issue. And in advocating closer attention to Russia, Amb. Ischinger and those who share his view seemmore interested in taking a pragmatic approach to national interests than in upholding the “En- lightenment values” they cite regarding Guantanamo. Purposes and Beliefs This division about basic values and interests, and the relationship between the two, reflects serious differences within the Alliance. The United States and most of the al- lies, especially the newer members in Central Europe, be- lieve that the extension of NATO’s defensive alliance is not complete and that continued enlargement is not in con- flict with Russia’s legitimate security interests. But Ger- many and France (and Russia) have a different vision of the future geography of European security. This funda- mental dichotomy will sharpen divergences in the willing- ness to take risks, raising questions about which responsibilities are shared, and which are not, within an alliance built on common values and a willingness to take on dangers and burdens for a larger cause. For perhaps the first time in NATO’s history, then, we may need to ask what happens to a military or secu- rity organization when fundamen- tal purposes diverge. For the cases of Afghanistan and enlargement raise questions not of means to ends, but of the ends themselves. And beyond the issue of ends and purposes in Europe, broader global issues will pose a challenge for NATO in practical terms. Even in the post–Cold War era, when the attention of U.S. policymakers has often turned in other directions, Europe’s fundamental importance has remained suffi- ciently clear and strong to ensure the mutual and contin- ued core relevance of each side of the Atlantic to the other. That situation may be changing. Many commentators have noted the extraordinary array of challenges the Obama administration faces as it approaches its first few months: Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, North Korea and the broader Middle East all present immediate dangers. In the longer term, China is both a key economic partner and a potential regional challenger. Latin America, including Mexico, requires tending, and Africa needs continued as- sistance. Given these challenges, there will be a real temptation for Washington to view European security with less ur- gency, just as many Europeans have feared would eventu- ally happen. After all, if the largest nations in continental Europe are content to grant Russia the sphere of influence it seems to seek, American leaders may not want to expend valuable energy and time resisting that course. While this would be disappointing and dangerous for the newer allies in Central Europe, who have contributed much where the United States has asked, the burden will be on them and like-minded Western European nations to work to close policy gaps to manageable scales. The greater risk, however, is that basic questions on be- liefs and purposes go unanswered and fester, leaving NATO less able to take united decisions. Washington could find itself working on critical issues alongside a hand- ful of allies, leaving the organization to attend to less con- troversial, and less important, issues. Like a self-fulfilling prophecy, fears of NATO’s irrelevance could thus be real- ized. Cause for Celebration This year’s 60th anniversary will, like all such mile- stones, prompt a new version of the old debate about F O C U S In April 2008, the Allies agreed that Ukraine and Georgia will at some point become members.