The Foreign Service Journal, April 2009

gressional authority in the stead of under-resourced civilian agencies. Re- establishing the proper authorities to State and USAID will begin to repair this problem. Congress must also give civilian institutions the personnel, fund- ing and guidance necessary to reclaim the execution of non-military activities and oversight of non-combat opera- tions. To achieve our top foreign policy objectives, the U.S. government must use all its elements of power. To do otherwise risks furthering the percep- tion that American foreign policy is principally implemented with the bay- onet. Ron Capps FSO, retired Bethesda, Md. Editor’s Note: Mr. Capps, the 2007 co-winner of AFSA’s William R. Rivkin Award for constructive dissent by a mid-level Foreign Service officer, is a program manager for peacekeeping with Refugees International. The Military Should Run PRTs Despite all the good advice in Cap- tain Sean Walsh’s article in the Febru- ary Journal (“Improving the PRT-Mili- tary Professional Relationship”), its basis is a bit shocking to this veteran of the pacification program in Vietnam (1969-1971). Specifically, why aren’t the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq embedded within the military brigade structure? In the July-August 2008 Journal , we learned from William Maley’s article (“NATO and Afghanistan: Made for Each Other?”) that in establishing the PRT program in Afghanistan, we drew upon the Civil Operations and Revolu- tionary Development Support model from Vietnam. In Vietnam, all State, USAID and military personnel in CORDS worked for the commander of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam: General Creighton Abrams, and his deputy, Ambassador William Colby. But in Iraq, apparently the de- cision was made to separate recon- struction operations from military operations, at least in terms of the chain of command. Much of Capt. Walsh’s good advice about getting along with the Army would pertain regardless of the PRT or- ganizational model. But given coun- terinsurgency strategy, where the Army mission of security rightly comes first, having separate chains of command makes no sense. The PRT and its mis- sion should be “organic” to the brigade structure. This means the brigade would “own” the PRT just as it “owns” its artillery capability. By making the PRT organic to the brigade, the brigade then owns, and is responsible for, the success of its mis- sion, eliminating any need for the team to “bum” rides or other brigade sup- port. However boneheaded a bri- gade commander may be about the need to win hearts and minds, he will respond to such requests if he knows a general is going to ask himhow his PRT is doing. In The Gamble , the new book on Iraq by Thomas Ricks, we see that it was Defense Secretary Donald Rums- feld’s decision not to support the PRTs. That alone is probably a very good rea- son to consolidate the counterinsur- gency mission in Iraq. Alfred R. Barr FSO, retired Washington, D.C. The Ground Truth About Virtual Presence Posts Shawn Dorman’s January article, “Global Repositioning in Perspective,” includes a brief and mostly balanced description of Virtual Presence Posts. The article accurately notes that the relative success of a VPP fundamentally depends on each mission’s commit- ment to increasing outreach to impor- tant locales with no permanent U.S. diplomatic presence. The article also includes an anony- mous remark from a “Washington- based FSO” who questions the value of VPPs. The officer is not accurately in- formed. Over the last five years, posts through their own serious and sus- tained efforts have established 56 VPPs, up from only five in 2003. More- over, over just the past year, posts have established 21 VPPs, including at least one new VPP in each regional bureau. Twelve new ones were created in China alone. The significant growth in the use of Virtual Presence Posts reflects the rec- ognized benefits and real-world results associated with a well-run VPP pro- gram. For example, VPPs provide posts with the means for more organ- ized and focusedmission travel, for bet- ter interagency coordination and for more strategic application of program and outreach resources. Another point of clarification: the Journal article reports that “in some countries, the VPPmodel does serve as a substitute for the American Presence Post.” This has been true at a few posts, yet VPPs are always more than just stand-ins for APPs. VPPs help coordi- nate the mission, involving all relevant sections with a mix of traditional diplo- macy (travel, programs, exchanges) and modern technologies (branded Web sites, electronic communication) in reaching out to important cities, com- munities or countries. For this reason, VPPs have been used as a “bridge” prior to launching an APP, ensuring 8 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / A P R I L 2 0 0 9 L E T T E R S