The Foreign Service Journal, April 2015

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | APRIL 2015 53 Forty years later, the experience still offers valuable insights for effective expeditionary diplomacy. BY RUFUS PH I L L I PS Rufus Phillips is the author of Why VietnamMatters: An Eyewitness Account of Lessons Not Learned (Naval In- stitute Press, 2008). His Vietnam involvement occurred between 1954 and 1968, when he served as a U.S. Army officer, CIA case officer, USAID official and consultant to the Department of State. He originated and directed the United States Operations Mission/Saigon’s Rural Affairs Office from 1962 to 1963. Phillips is a senior fellow at the National Strategy Information Center, where he has published papers addressing gaps in our civilian national security capabilities abroad. He is a recognized expert and has provided pro bono counterinsurgency advice to the U.S. embassy in Kabul. He is a member of DACOR and was inducted recently into the OCS Hall of Fame at Ft. Benning, Georgia. He has lectured at the National War Col- lege and at the Counterinsurgency Center at Ft. Leavenworth. T here are lessons to be learned from our counterinsurgency efforts in Viet- nam that remain relevant today. Chief among them is this: although our understanding and steadfast sup- port can make a significant difference, ultimate success depends on the people we are assisting. Likewise, our insufficient and often mistaken grasp of the insurgent enemy and the cultural and political context of the involved country and its people can greatly contribute to Counterinsurgency in Vietnam: Lessons for Today FOCUS ON THE FOREIGN SERVICE IN VIETNAM failure. These precepts sound simple, but they are often over- looked because we are so focused on ourselves. Another lesson is that counterinsurgency works when politics and development are as much a focus as security. For lasting effect, counterinsurgency cannot be divorced from politi- cal reform and progress from the top down, as well as from the community level up, of the country we are helping. The active support of a majority of the country’s population for its govern- ment is critical. Countering insurgencies by establishing security through military and police operations is a necessary precondi- tion for political progress, but only indigenous governments that become responsive to their own people can ensure that security endures. Counterinsurgency in Vietnam went through various phases in terms of what it meant, how it was carried out and how the United States helped or hindered. Understanding the lessons that experience holds for today requires some history. Early Efforts Counterinsurgency actually began in Vietnam during the Indochina War (1946-1954) and was known as “pacification.” The French created military-civilian teams (called équipes mobiles), which performed civil functions in conjunction with military operations aimed at establishing French control over areas dominated by the communist Viet Minh. Such efforts were fatally undermined, however, by French unwillingness to give