The Foreign Service Journal, April 2015

60 APRIL 2015 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL Bunker, Colby dealt directly with host-government officials at all levels, from Pres. Thieu on down, on counterinsurgency matters. This helped avoid misunderstandings and improved implementation. He was able to bring trusted and independent information and political judgment to bear at higher command levels, where it counted. No such across-the-board access had existed since the original Rural Affairs operation in 1962-1963. In 1969 CORDS began supporting a series of nationwide counterinsurgency plans in what was called an “Accelerated Pacification Campaign.” Province-by-province plans prepared with Vietnamese participation called for the gradual extension of control outward from hamlets already supporting the gov- ernment into areas under Viet Cong influence, while postpon- ing contesting areas under complete Viet Cong dominance. A Vietnamese government decision to treat local security force service as a substitute for the regular military draft encouraged Left to right, Dick Holbrooke, Bob Komer (head of CORDS), Dick’s brother, Andy, then in the Army, and Vlad Lehovich, in Nha Trang in 1967. Courtesy of Vlad Lehovich a rapid increase in local defense forces. Counterinsurgency effectiveness was further enhanced by the extension of more local self-government (e.g., elections for village chiefs and councils and for provincial councils). Equipped with its own funds, CORDS injected supplemen- tary funding at the local level, adding to the larger volume of funds flowing through Vietnamese government channels on a decentralized basis. Rural development programs launched by Rural Affairs were accelerated, and new ones were added. Despite the Thieu government’s drawbacks—too much corrup- tion and a lack of openness and political legitimacy—counter- insurgency was strongly backed from the top. Such government actions as fully implementing land reform had a beneficial political effect, particularly in the Delta. CORDS also supported an intelligence and armed action program directed at the local Viet Cong infrastructure. Origi- nated by the South Vietnamese, it became known as “Phoenix.” Armed provincial teams conducted raids against the local insurgency to remove its members from the battlefield by cap- ture, if possible. CORDS advisory instructions clearly empha- sized capture, to gain intelligence. While excesses did occur, the program acquired a bad reputation in the United States based largely on unsubstantiated congressional testimony. As CORDS grew, its American advisory personnel were becoming better prepared.