The Foreign Service Journal, April 2015

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | APRIL 2015 61 North Vietnamese comments after the war would give consid- erable credit to Phoenix for obliging local Viet Cong political and military cadre to move to neighboring Cambodia. As CORDS grew, its American advisory personnel were becoming better prepared. A counterinsurgency training cen- ter, originally set up in 1964 in Hawaii by USAID, was moved to Washington to train CORDS advisers. Between 1968 and 1973, the Vietnam Training Center turned out 1,845 mostly civilian advisers from State, USAID and the CIA, of which about 250 became Vietnamese speakers. Instruction consisted of a man- datory 10 weeks in the role of an adviser, counterinsurgency concepts, development programs and familiarity with Viet- namese culture, history and language. Some trainees contin- ued with intensive language for up to a year. Center graduates added significantly to CORDS success. By 1972, counterinsurgency had succeeded in pacifying most of South Vietnam with the indispensable and strong sup- port of CORDS. At the time, the CORDS program did not get the recognition it deserved. After the 1973 Paris Peace Accords, instead of a measured transition to full South Vietnamese con- trol, CORDS support was precipitously withdrawn. Two years later, when, in the absence of U.S. logistical or air support, South Vietnam collapsed in the face of an all-out conventional invasion by the entire North Vietnamese Army, the CORDS story was buried in the rubble—not to be revived until after 9/11. Conclusions Lessons learned from the overall experience, involving both sides of the U.S.-Vietnamese relationship, apply to many fragile countries currently under internal extremist threat. Some have concluded from CORDS that complete U.S. unity of command is necessary for counterinsurgency assistance to be effective. However, at the probably less-intense scale of continuing U.S. involvement in an advisory capacity to fragile states dealing with incipient and existing insurgencies, what is most essential is civilian-military unity of strategy and effort. This can be achieved if both the civilian and military sides are equally geared up to work together, which puts a premium on skilled civilian participation from the State Department. Effective service of this kind requires personal capability and specialized training including language, as well as being able to operate more freely in dangerous environments than present security rules allow. This is a large part of why State needs to create a relatively small group of highly trained expe- ditionary diplomats. They would not only help U.S. mission chiefs manage the political and development sides of stabilization efforts in vul- nerable states, but coordinate our counterinsurgency advisory efforts, as well. The continuing contest with extremists over the political and security stability of such states requires a longer- term and more focused approach. In this context, some useful lessons can be drawn from the Vietnam counterinsurgency experience: • Counterinsurgency cannot succeed without a political strategy which leads to the host country’s government gaining the strong support of its own people. This support is critical to long-term stability and cannot be imposed from the top down, but must be earned by deeds that are basically democratic in nature. • Security is essential for political stability; but without political progress, security will not endure. For the United States, carrying out an effective political strategy with skilled civilian advisory assistance, as well as wise, effective military advice, can be critical. • Protection of the population (as stressed in the current U.S. armed forces counterinsurgency manual) and winning its support is necessary for success. Although only indigenous governments can ultimately win this kind of struggle, well- informed and wise U.S. support and advice can be essential. • Success in providing effective help for host-government counterinsurgency is proportional to the amount of mental effort devoted by us to understanding the nature of the country, the aspirations of its people and the insurgent enemy. • A completely integrated U.S. civilian-military advisory effort is ideal. However, in the current and probable future circumstances of less massive U.S. interventions, our counter- insurgency support needs to be a collegial venture marked by close interagency cooperation with a combined political, mili- tary and development focus. There also needs to be an effective organizational focus on the host government side. After the 1973 Paris Peace Accords, instead of ameasured transition to full South Vietnamese control, CORDS support was precipitously withdrawn.