The Foreign Service Journal, April 2016

22 APRIL 2016 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL for the U.S. government, and now as the deputy high commissioner for refugees. Can you compare the two experiences? KTC: Actually, conducting diplo- macy in the humanitarian compo- nent of a national government is similar to doing so in a U.N. humani- tarian agency, though it is not always perceived in the same light by dif- ferent parties. We seek to save lives and alleviate suffering according to principles that govern how such aid is provided—according to need, irrespective of political, military or strategic objectives, in an impartial and neutral way. Both entities work through humanitarian diplomacy to solve problems of protection and lack of access to assistance from various vantage points—strategic (e.g., at the level of the high commissioner or a senior U.S. government official), operational (e.g., UNHCR representatives or State refugee coordinators) and field level (e.g., on specific issues for both national governments and UNHCR, such as cases of refoulement, closed borders, lack of access to refugees in detention or in specific geographic areas). In addition to defining objectives consistent with the needs of the affected population and the mandate of the home bureau (in this case, State’s PRM), a representative of the U.S. government must also conduct humanitarian diplomacy according to objec- tives consistent with U.S. government policy. This is not the case for UNHCR, which has a specific mandate enshrined by interna- tional law and the U.N. General Assembly. FSJ: Does the United States conduct humanitarian diplomacy differently than others? How would the rest of the world rate the United States on the effectiveness of its humanitarian diplomacy? What could it be doing better? KTC: Simply put, protection and assistance are Band-Aids in the absence of political and economic solutions to forced displacement. Humanitarian diplomacy is an essential element to deliver as much aid as possible while other solutions are negotiated (e.g., returns home, local integration, third-country resettlement for a lucky few). Partly as a result of being located in the “foreign ministry,” the U.S. government’s humanitarians are favorably known for bringing a level of political awareness into discussions—this involves an intuitive grasp of the politi- cal motives on the part of various actors and the constraints on responders, and the ability to distinguish among positions, bottom lines and interests to come up with well-crafted strategies to address them. The best thing the United States can do is continue to be UNHCR’s toughest private critic (to make us stronger, more collaborative and more effective) and our strongest public, moral and financial sup- porter, especially during these days of unprecedented need and complex and seemingly intractable political challenges. This should be done with a clear and appreciable distance between political and humanitarian U.S. government objectives. We count on the United States to continue to press us on our programs, push us to do better, but then use its heft (in moderation) to push for refugee rights and other issues. FSJ: How can the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Department of State prepare the next generation of practi- tioners to adequately respond to tomorrow’s challenges? KTC: In my view, there need to be more USAID and State Department Foreign Service and Civil Service staff exchanges, more cross-training, so that humanitarian and development experts speak the same language. U.S. government humanitar- ians should be included routinely in overall foreign policymaking, to ensure that the humanitarian implications of proposed diplo- matic or military actions are well understood by decision-makers. The U.S. government should second staff members to key interna- tional, nongovernmental and civil society organizations (not just humanitarian, but also human rights, peacekeeping, political and security groups) to better appreciate current challenges and prepare for the future. I base this recommendation on my personal experience, which was heavily influenced by a secondment to UNHCR to serve as a protection officer in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, during the height of the outflow of Rohingya refugees fromMyanmar in the early 1990s. There I used tools of humanitarian diplomacy daily to influence camp management in the design of services so as not to prejudice women and children, and I advocated with the government on fundamental protection principles like the right to seek asylum. I have carried those and similar experiences with me through my 25 years as a humanitarian diplomat, and now as U.N. deputy high commissioner for refugees. n Protection and assistance are Band- Aids in the absence of political and economic solutions to forced displacement.