The Foreign Service Journal, April 2017

10 APRIL 2017 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL LETTERS Ambassadorial Appointments The January-February issue of the FSJ was of special interest largely—but by no means entirely—due to its focus on the change of administrations. What I found most compelling were the pieces by two old (should I say aging or elderly?) friends and former colleagues, Ambassadors Ed Peck and Tom Boyatt. Ed set forth a persua- sive, but I believe some- what superficial, plea to end political ambassadorial appointments; Tom outlined the executive branch’s “consti- tutional officers” that include ambassadors, ministers and consuls. The latter are precisely why I challenge Ed’s goal. The power to name ambassadors resides with the president, subject, of course, to Senate ratification. I am sure Ed recognizes that all presidents are loath to undermine or diminish their limited powers and, hence, are understandably unwilling to end the practice of nominat- ing political allies, whether “bundlers” or distinguished former officials, academics or others with excellent qualifications. That power is not going to be ceded— not now, not ever—barring constitutional amendment. And that’s not going to hap- pen. Let us grow up and acknowledge that fact. If I speak heresy, so be it. Where we may be able to make some progress is in ensuring that the Sen- ate carries out its obligation to ensure appointees are well qualified for the posi- tion. I have had the honor to serve under five political appointee ambassadors, including Eliot Richardson and Kingman Brewster; I also had the opportunity to see Edwin Reischauer in action in Japan. They were all extraordinarily able, more than equal to most of their career peers. Do we wish to lose this type of “political” ambassador? I certainly don’t. I also had the opportunity, as director of Northern European affairs, to oversee the operations of embassies headed by eight political appointees, only four of whom seemed competent to me, and a couple of those only at the margin. But then one of the two career ambassadors in that group of countries was relieved for improper behavior. My bottom line is to urge AFSA and its members to accept that no president is going to give away the ambassadorial appoint- ment power; that the Senate is legally obligated to ensure ambassadorial nominees are well quali- fied, and should be pressured to meet that goal; and that highly distinguished Americans from outside the Service can perform as well as or better than their career counterparts. That most political appointee ambas- sadors do not should tell us that the core problem is not the concept, but its execu- tion: ensure the Senate confirms only those who are well qualified. Jack R. Binns Ambassador, retired Tucson, Arizona Merge USAID Fully into State? Bilateral economic development assistance continues to be an important U.S. diplomatic tool in our complex and fractured world. Thomas Adams high- lights this well in his January-February article, “Foreign Assistance: Time to Sharpen a Vital Diplomatic Tool.” If adopted, his eight well-thought- out recommendations for improvement would make our assistance more effec- tive and efficient. But Adams does not address the pecu- liar administrative status of our main assistance agency, the U.S. Agency for International Development. I was with USAID at its creation, being a project offi- cer with the predecessor agency Devel- opment Loan Fund. Presently USAID is neither fish nor fowl, being half in and half out of the State Department. The duplications and costly overlaps of USAID and State are substantial. Mr. Adams notes that State houses a large assistance operation—the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. In addition, both entities have humanitarian relief offices, development assistance policy and planning offices, assistance budget and congressional liaison operations, as well as manage- ment offices. The Trump administration may opt to leave things as they are. But if the administration truly wants to reduce duplications and make the management of assistance more rational and effective, and less costly, there are two options. One is to make USAID a separate agency again, mustering in it all State Department development activities and as many of the other assistance spigots around government as possible (e.g., the Millennium Challenge Account, the Overseas Private Investment Corpora- tion, the Trade and Development Agency and others). The other is to fold the rest of USAID completely into State as a separate Devel- opment Bureau and specialty (cone) equal to other bureaus and specialties, at the same time absorbing as many of the other spigots as possible and gaining greater influence over the rest. The first option seems unlikely; the trend is to reduce the number of pro-