The Foreign Service Journal, April 2017

36 APRIL 2017 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL Navigating the Difficult Postwar Years Most of the goals and methods of America’s new global role were hammered out in Europe during the difficult years after 1945. The same holds true for the global reach of American multinational corporations: as of 2015, American investment in Europe was two and one-half times larger than it was in China. As Richard Holbrooke stated in his groundbreaking article in the spring 1995 edition of Foreign Affairs , circumstances had conspired to make America a European power. The “normality” of this status, of which my bosses were so cer- tain in 1964, was not, however, a natural occurrence. To achieve it, we had struggled with a Europe beset by historic conflicts, unsta- ble in its existence and unsure about its future. The “normality” of Europe was to be deeply divided and strategically paralyzed. This remains the case today. Had America not been on the scene, it is not hard to imagine what would have happened. In addition, the Cold War gave an essentially isolationist America a reason to be engaged in the world. Distrust of Europe was replaced by a sense of joint commitment to maintaining the peace. Loss of that sense of common purpose after the Cold War is one of the reasons there is so much debate on both sides of the Atlantic about the future of the Western world. But the news is not all bad. Since 1990, America’s digital leadership has resulted in a virtual integration of our economic systems. Whatever Pres. Trump and his advisers may believe, it would be difficult if not impossible to unravel the complex ties that have been built. And the effort to keep the partnership running is minor compared to the costs of its collapse. But if this is so, why is there again a wave of isolation- ist sentiment in the United States? A sentiment so strong that it helped propel Donald Trump into power? Why, in the flush of victory in the Cold War, did the Bush administra- tion turn its back on “old Europe” in favor of “coalitions of the willing”? And why did Barack Obama run so fast from leadership in Europe that, after 2014, he essentially turned relations with Russia over to Germany to manage? Behind the Isolationist Impulse There are two answers to that question. The first is change — dramatic, rapid and fundamental change. As the late Alvin Toffler suggested in his 1970 classic, Future Shock , too much change overloads us psychologically, affects our decision- making and weakens our ability to act rationally. The relentless pace of globalization has led to a sort of collective post-trau- matic shock disorder among Western leaders and publics. It will not end soon. The second answer goes back to the beginnings of America’s relationship with the rest of the world. From the earliest days of their existence, the new United States felt pushed and threat- ened by their cousins in Europe—often rightly so. Europeans were ready to pounce on the weak new republic. George Wash- ington warned against foreign entanglements in his famous farewell speech in 1796, and his words have been repeated regularly ever since. Even after the horrors of the two world wars, President Franklin D. Roosevelt shocked Winston Churchill in 1945 by telling him the United States would take care of Japan, but Europe was Britain’s to put back together. Luckily the Russians changed our minds. America’s skepticism about global engagement has always been more than a policy; it is an expression of a national point of view about ourselves and our place in the world, a view that contrasts the simple virtues of our republic with the subtle and complex qualities (some say corruptions) of foreigners. We always feel somehow cheated by others, even by our clos- est friends. One need only follow the Trump Islamic scare to understand the point. Once challenges such as the Cold War were over- come, packing up and going home became the essence of our long-term strategy. In 1992, Francis Fukayama even proclaimed the end of history, suggesting that Pax Americana was now an automatic thing. By 2011, Europe’s loss of strategic importance was certi- fied by none other than the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, Richard Haass. In “Why Europe No Longer Matters,” published in June 2011 by The Washington Post , Haass suggeste d that Europe had become irrelevant to American interests. He concluded: “If NATO didn’t exist today, would anyone feel com- pelled to create it? The honest, if awkward, answer is no.” Haass may have, in fact, accurately predicted the way many Americans would answer his question. But his answer, Most of the goals and methods of America’s new global role were hammered out in Europe during the difficult years after 1945.