The Foreign Service Journal, April 2019

24 APRIL 2019 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL the history of the world it is still unique and a triumph of inter- state cooperation. The first secretary general of NATO was Lord Ismay. In his autobiography he recounts being strong-armed by Winston Churchill (I know the feeling) to take on the infant alliance. After fighting a distinguished war and settling into a comfortable and interesting Cabinet position, he was persuaded to go to NATO headquarters in Paris. But he took to it and tells of his feelings when he left after five years: “We were utterly miserable. The Council had been like a large family, and the international staff had seemed like our children.” In his farewell speech in Bonn inMay 1959, Lord Ismay made points as relevant today as they were then. He spoke of the defen- sive shield that had been built up, “which, not yet as strong as might be wished, is an essential feature of the deterrent to aggression. Who would have thought that sovereign states would entrust their precious armed forces to the command of nationals other than their own in times of peace? But this is what has come to pass.” Even more prophetically he said this: “And if at times we find the burden heavy, let us remember that the North Atlantic Alli- ance is not only an obligation which sovereign states have under- taken of their own free will, but an insurance against the unspeak- able horrors of a war which would destroy civilization.” As we contemplate a world wholly different from that of 1959, his words seem to echo what needs to be repeated as we com- memorate NATO 60 years later. The unity still has to be ensured; the resolution has to be maintained; the capabilities have to be relevant and adequate; and the sense of purpose has to be appro- priate to the new and novel threats we face today. We are told that the present occupant of the White House, in NATO’s strongest nation, has been questioning U.S. member- ship in the alliance. Worrying as that undoubtedly is, it may have reminded other allies of both the value of NATO and their own responsibilities to “bear the burden” of its means. Nothing better underlines the importance of American leadership in the world than the thought of losing it. Burden sharing has long been a theme of American politi- cians, including the cheerleaders for the alliance—and with good reason. But a complacency that America will always be there with its clout and resources has held back the investment required for Europe’s (and Canada’s) contribution to the common effort. Donald Trump has shattered that complacency and for that, if for nothing else, we should be grateful. The uphill task of getting close, not just to agreed figures because they are mere indica- tions, but to having the right capabilities and attitude, will not be easy. But if European populations are to be kept safe in an uncertain future, the investment is not an optional extra. So, what should be on the checklist for NATO at 70? The time has come to go beyond publishing national gross spending figures on defence. Too often the attempt to meet the agreed 2 percent target involves shady financial engineering. The composition of the funding has also to be made public. What last- ing value is 2 percent if it is made up of pensions and equipment for the last but one war? Up to now we have been reluctant to name and shame on the real military spending figures. It was claimed that it might give our adversaries details they would exploit. In the era of mass surveil- lance and data collection, this is an outdated view. Publics have the right to know what is being spent, on what and to what end. Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has highlighted what he calls the three Cs: “cash, capabilities and contributions.” In other words, we need forces which can go far, go fast, hit hard and stay long. Much more emphasis has to be put on intelligence and cyber defenses. Quantifying spending on this crucial arm of defense needs to be a priority. We need to know what is being spent on this new and vital front line. A cyberattack on a nation or a city cannot be responded to with a main battle tank. And we have far too many of them and too little of the other. European contributions are starting to increase and the Sep- tember 2014 Wales Summit, by highlighting targets on readiness and equipment spending, has accelerated change. We need less talk now about “European armies” and “strategic autonomy.” These are empty buzzwords meaning little, and we need more of an emphasis on ending duplication and inefficiency in defense budgets. Fancy wiring diagrams—as I have often said—which are not connected to modern capabilities are for show, not shooting. NATO needs to reinforce its partnerships. As long as countries seek membership or a close relationship with all the facets of NATO, both military and civil, they should be encouraged. Membership standards, however, must be main- tained. Military compatibility and democratic credentials are fun- damental. There should be no short-cut to membership in such an elite organization. And adherence to those standards does not end with accession—there is a continuing responsibility. Nothing better underlines the importance of American leadership in the world than the thought of losing it.