The Foreign Service Journal, April 2019

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | APRIL 2019 27 Current discontents do not indicate that NATO is on a path to imminent irrelevance; but they do demonstrate that strategic consen- sus will likely need to be tempo- rarily offset by wins at the func- tional and tactical level. Sustaining momentum and stewarding operational-level victories will be a critical task for diplomats, officials and experts engaging in alliance politics today. Old Storms and New Ones For many watching U.S.-NATO politics as the 70th anniver- sary nears, there is clearly a sense of alarm. But history reveals that this is not the first difficult moment facing the alliance. Many NATO-watchers would cite the Suez Crisis or, more recently, the second Iraq War as moments of significant political turmoil. But as renowned historian Sir Michael Howard argued in his 1999 Foreign Affairs article evaluating the NATO alliance at 50, the two periods of most serious concern were those sur- rounding the Cuban Missile Crisis (1958-1963) and the Euromis- sile Crisis (1979-1984). In both instances, the United States questioned the legiti- macy of its own deterrent capability, and this fueled existential doubts across the alliance. As it happened, both situations were alleviated by strong U.S. leadership that held the Soviets in check and revived allied trust and confidence, allowing both the United States and the alliance to emerge stronger. These examples are instructive because they demonstrate that strategic challenges facing U.S. NATO policy can be weath- ered in extremely difficult and strategically daunting circum- stances. Moreover, the situation can be corrected by decisive U.S. leadership and determination in the interest of the allies. These examples are also illuminating because they point to what is different in NATO politics today. The fundamental challenge facing U.S. NATO policy is no longer necessarily one of self-confidence, but of political will. This can be more problematic for the alliance because it suggests that U.S. policy could trend toward willful strategic estrangement. Moreover, it could happen even though that option is incongruous with the demands of the current global context. Although today’s strategic reality does not feature a unified collective angst directed at one strategic priority, as was the case during the Cold War, it is not without significant challenges. In fact, it presents a complicated picture of new risks across regions in an era of shifting geopolitics. Gone are the days when many assumed that a new, cooperative and ever-expanding multilateral, democratic world that enhanced the security of all those willing to play by its rules was imminent. Instead, China’s expanding geo-economic influence through Central Asia, Africa and now much of Europe signals an increased ambition to reset the rules of the road. Simultaneously, Russia is directly challenging a spectrum of post–Cold War assumptions, both in the post-Soviet space as well as in places like the Middle East. Adding to this, many within Europe and the alliance itself are calling into question some of the value-laden foundational ele- ments of the Washington Treaty, leading to decision-making that departs from unified alliance interests (e.g., Turkey’s decision to purchase Russia’s S-400 missile defense system despite protest from allies). For the United States, the growing multipolarity directly challenges the preponderance of U.S. capability and influence across the globe, and Washington’s ability to effectively tackle a wide range of threats. Official U.S. policy documents over recent years recognize this reality. The most recent National Security Strategy claimed that: “The United States will respond to the growing political, economic and military competitions we face around the world. China and Russia challenge American power, influence and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity.” And speaking to U.S. military capabilities, the document goes on to say: “U.S. advantages are shrinking as rival states modernize and build up their conventional and nuclear forces.” The document also points to unconventional threats chal- lenging U.S. security policy that span domains and confuse traditional responses. A quick look at current trends show that much of today’s geopolitical competition is happening at a sub- conventional level. Political warfare fought through economic coercion, cyber activity and propaganda is penetrating societ- ies in Europe and the United States. To counter these threats, a robust and collective response is required. As the United States and NATO face the most difficult geo- political environment of the last 30 years, the alliance is staring down a significant and self-inflicted question of legitimacy. Specifically, for U.S. policy toward NATO, the key factor under- President Harry S Truman signs the Washington Treaty forming NATO on April 4, 1949, in Washington, D.C. Secretary of State Dean Acheson stands to his left with the document folder.