The Foreign Service Journal, April 2019

28 APRIL 2019 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL mining fundamental confidence in the alliance is a question of whether the United States should continue to engage in the same fashion, not whether it is able to. An added layer to this irony is the fact that this is occurring at a time when U.S. policy so acutely needs dependable, capable and strong allies to confront the variety of geopolitical threats fac- ing the United States in a rising multipolarity. NATO is a venue for political engagement, as well as a defensive alliance. It can foster resilience within and across societies, and respond to new and asymmetric threats. As the organization enters its eighth decade, a strong dose of realism for NATOmembers—including the United States—would go a long way in helping realize the critical role the alliance will play in meeting today’s challenges. For example, allies have agreed to set up counter-hybrid support teams that will assist and advise member-states in responding to various hybrid attacks. This includes cyberattacks, disinformation and economic pressure, among others. Moreover, NATO has taken large steps to bolster alliance credibility in unconventional domains like cyberspace. In August last year, the alliance launched a Cyber Operations Center. Beyond this, NATO continues to be a conventional force multiplier. NATO joined the global coalition to defeat ISIS, sup- porting the coalition’s information sharing capability and airspace management. NATO also started a training and capacity-building mission in Iraq to help counter terrorism in the region and bolster Iraqi forces. To counter Russian aggression in Eastern Europe, several NATOmembers stepped up to the plate with NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence, deploying a multinational deterrent presence in the Baltic states and Poland. Moreover, many nations began increasing defense spending in response to Russia’s blatant military aggressions against Ukraine in and since 2014. Finally, NATO’s political advantages should not be dismissed. While divisions exist, the alliance provides an essential platform for deliberation and debate on how to confront the many chal- lenges facing the various NATO allies across regions and domains. And because of its key role, NATO also provides a prominent space for American leadership in the world. Recent U.S. action on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the support of NATO allies for the U.S. withdrawal notice, is indicative of this. When the decision was hastily announced, it was met with wide- spread outcry. However, after deliberation and diplomacy within the alliance, the United States was able to articulate a position that was supported by allies, which gave added weight to the U.S. position. It’s Not Just about U.S. Policy The relevance of the alliance for the United States is clear. But it would be misguided to solely focus on this aspect of NATO politics and fail to address the real deficiencies within the alliance as it exists today. Certainly, capabilities gaps and burden-sharing challenges have contributed to the frustration of U.S. political will. As the geopolitical context has changed, impatience with these long-standing challenges has only further soured the American appetite. Without question, defense spending remains at the top of the “to do” list for European counterparts in NATO. The United States benefits from its leadership role in the alliance, but the balance of current spending levels is not sustainable. And in the absence of a serious and sustained attempt to address meager European bud- gets, U.S. foreign policy officials and experts will continue to ques- tion whether the United States is getting a fair shake. It is in the interest of all NATOmember-states to remove this talking point from alliance discussions, or at least greatly reduce it. Many NATO member-states, to their credit, began responding to an increas- ingly volatile security environment as early as 2014 by reversing course on the years of dwindling defense budgets. However, European efforts should not just aim to address defense spending levels. NATOmember countries must look at continued capability gaps and interoperability issues, as well. Dur- ing the 2011 Libya mission some interoperability successes were a signal of confidence, but information-sharing hurdles and capa- bility limitations facing key European allies were not. Increased investment over the past few years, as well as the new commands established after the last summit, should help. However, improve- ment in these areas must remain a priority. Moreover, NATO states that are also members of the E.U. must be sure they are not creating redundancies in similar E.U. initiatives, while leverag- ing those capabilities where possible (particularly in the realm of hybrid threats). Finally, European NATO nations must move past the divide between eastern and southern member-states on threat percep- tion, which leads to a false choice between either deterring Russia or fighting terrorism. NATO is a defensive alliance. Protecting While divisions exist, the alliance provides an essential platform for deliberation and debate on how to confront the many challenges facing the various NATO allies.