The Foreign Service Journal, April 2019

32 APRIL 2019 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL working to improve resilience, security and continuity of gover- nance. Both documents call for greater NATO-E.U. cooperation in addressing hybrid threats. And since June 2016, both organizations have agreed on dozens of areas in which to focus their efforts. To their credit, neither organization has fixated on an exact definition of hybrid threats, but instead concentrated on identifying the changes to their working methods and approaches that will best allow them to effectively address them. Within both NATO and the E.U. there is general consensus on four steps to addressing hybrid threats: detection, attribution, response and recovery. Detection refers to the ability to detect a hostile state action in time to react and minimize any potential damage. Attribution , the more complex follow-on to detec- tion, is the ability to attribute an attack to a specific actor and to differentiate it from an accident, system failure or human error. Response , which is greatly dependent on accurate, timely and credible detection and attribution to allow for sound crisis deci- sion-making, is to change security posture or retaliate against the actor to which the hostile action is attributed (in accordance with existing just war ethics). Recovery is the ability to restore functionality to the systems, capabilities or societal coherence attacked through the hostile action. It is important to note that these steps are not sequential; for example, recovery can begin immediately after detection to “stop the bleeding,” and some internal response postural deci- sions can be made prior to attribution. Within NATO it can be difficult to reach a consensus on Article 5 (collective defense) in the face of a hybrid campaign; however, a stricken ally can always bring its security concerns to the alliance via Article 4, under which allies can exchange views and information and discuss issues prior to taking any action. Thus, Article 4 consultations are the most likely venue for the North Atlantic Council to first discuss options when facing hybrid aggression against an ally. Within the European Union, Article 42 (7) of the Treaty of the European Union and Article 222 of the Treaty on the Function- ing of the European Union are the most applicable to hybrid threats. Though similar to NATO’s Article 5 in that it is triggered by an armed attack on a member-state, Article 42(7) can also be applied to some situations below the threshold of armed attack. Article 222 (the Solidarity Clause) applies more broadly to natural or manmade disasters, terrorist attacks and situations that align more closely with a hybrid campaign. It is also tied to the E.U.’s Solidarity Fund, which can provide immediate funding to recovery and response efforts. A Process Approach Each time we face a new security challenge, a defense or security contractor is waiting in the wings to sell us a solution. But in the case of hybrid threats, there is no system we can buy or new organization we can establish to mitigate these threats. Instead, everything we’ve learned since 2014 tells us that we must adapt our legal frameworks and working culture, and improve the connective tissue between ministries and organi- zations, to enable our own governments and organizations to better protect themselves. Within the United States, our national security culture’s dependence on buying solutions from contractors has hindered our ability to make more progress on this. Allies and partners such as the U.K. and Finland are farther ahead of us because they have taken a process approach to the challenge. So where to begin? At a meeting of the European Union’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the North Atlantic Council in September 2018, the European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats led a scenario-based discussion on addressing hybrid threats. Author Chris Courtney, seated behind the NATO DSG and the PSC Chair, assisted with the deliberations. ©EUROPEANUNION/ENZOZUCCHI