The Foreign Service Journal, April 2019

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | APRIL 2019 33 First , countering hybrid threats requires member-states to focus on internal resilience. This calls for a cultural shift from the expeditionary-only mindset, in which ministries of foreign affairs and ministries of defense have primacy, to one in which ministries of the interior and ministries of public protection often take a leading role. At the same time, the inter-state nature of hybrid threats, especially in the multilateral context, means that foreign ministries continue to take a leading role, albeit in a much broader whole-of government effort. In the expeditionary era NATO became accustomed to operating in other nations’ territories, and its internally focused Civil Emergency Planning Committee and civil defense aspects atrophied. Today, NATO again sees national resilience as a criti- cal element of collective defense, and since 2014 the CEPC has put renewed emphasis on working with allies to meet the NATO Resilience Baseline Requirements set at the Warsaw Summit in 2016. The seven NATO resilience baseline requirements are: • Assured continuity of government and critical government services • Resilient energy supplies • Ability to deal effectively with the uncontrolled movement of people • Resilient food and water resources • Ability to deal with mass casualties • Resilient communications systems • Resilient transportation systems. In 2018, NATO allies and NATO headquarters staff con- ducted assessments of each member-state’s ability to meet these requirements and identified shortfalls. Second , member-states need to ensure that their legal frame- works eliminate gray areas of uncertain or nonexistent govern- ment authority. Hybrid attacks often take place in the gray zones between the authorities of different ministries. Several NATO allies and partners have conducted extensive internal reviews and tabletop exercises to identify gaps and vulnerabilities in their legal frameworks. Subsequently, they have worked with their parliaments to close legal gaps and clear up any potential confusion on roles and authorities. Third , member-states must deepen their level of cooperation internally and internationally to build the trust and connective tissue necessary to counter hybrid threats. The two greatest chal- lenges thus far have been attribution and crisis decision-making to determine appropriate and measured responses. Both require a high level of trust and familiarity between officials, ministries and institutions. Enhanced Cooperation Currently NATO and the E.U. are working together on enhanced cooperation in four areas: civil-military planning, cyber defense, information-sharing and analysis, and coordinated strategic com- munications. Since 2016, they have agreed on 74 areas of deeper cooperation, 20 of which relate to countering hybrid threats. The European Centre of Excellence for Countering HybridThreats, established in 2017 in Helsinki, effectively contributes to strength- ening NATO-E.U. cooperation in this area. Both organizations’ personnel have participated in a number of the center’s activities. In September 2018, NATO’s North Atlantic Council and the E.U.’s Peace and Security Committee held the first-ever scenario- based discussion on hybrid threats, and subsequent parallel exercises have validated the improved cooperative working mechanisms being put into place at staff and senior levels. Also in late 2018, NATO adopted the concept of establishing Counter Hybrid Support Teams to give ad hoc assistance to allies in the event of a hybrid crisis. These teams are being fielded and exer- cised in 2019, and it remains to be seen how allies requesting assistance may integrate them into their own national processes. In any case, determining attribution of potential hybrid attacks and decisions on responses to them (including any public announcements) remains a sovereign responsibility of the stricken nation. Internally, providing credible deterrence to hybrid threats is straightforward: building and maintaining resilient, credible and capable governance that raises the price of hybrid aggression and reduces its chance for success. To do so requires cooperation and collaboration from all entities. Depending on the level of willingness of different actors to work together, there are three levels of national and multi- lateral cooperation that enable governments and societies to better address hybrid threats. First is a “whole-of-government” approach, in which all agencies and ministries from the national to local level cooperate, set broad common goals and share information. Second is a “whole-of-society” approach, which is similar to a whole-of-government approach, but also includes Countering hybrid threats requires member-states to focus on internal resilience. This calls for a cultural shift from the expeditionary-only mindset.