The Foreign Service Journal, April 2019

Perspectives on NATO From the FSJ Archive Whether more than one government would believe that its security and possibly eventual defense would be better served by less rather than more integration is highly questionable. —Theodore C. Achilles, FSO, July 1963 FSJ The Resurrection of NATO–1968 Americans who work in international organizations are subject to a rather specialized affliction. They have to get used to reading every week or two that their organization is dead. I noticed this in the years I spent working on the United Nations; and when I arrived in Paris two years ago, I found the death of NATO was also being widely and prematurely reported. I don’t propose to argue NATO’s survival value. But I will talk about the transfiguration of NATO, which, unlike its death, has been inadequately reported. When France left the integrated military system, each of the other fourteen governments had to decide whether to follow France’s example or stick with its Treaty obligations. When the smoke cleared, the score was 14 to 1. Western Europe still had to be defended; the Fourteen decided, if that had to be done for a while without France, that was politically tiresome but militarily tolerable. The NATOmili- tary headquarters, and their American and Canadian support units, moved out of France with truly miraculous dispatch. And the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s political board of directors, decided on its own to move to Brussels. But then something happened that nobody had predicted. With France standing aside, the Fourteen set up a NATO strategy council of their own; and the renewed political interest in NATO unity had a sudden and galvanizing effect on the quality of the NATO defense system. —Harlan Cleveland, FSO, April 1968 FSJ France, NATO and Tactical Nuclear Weapons–1977 For the first time since General de Gaulle declared his inde- pendence of NATO, both the political needs of France and the military needs of the alliance may dictate a closing of the gap. Vehicles for increased cooperation could be the advent of the French tactical nuclear weapon, the Pluton, and NATO’s own arguments about what to do about its tactical nuclear arsenal. What sort of advantages can be drawn by U.S. and NATO American and European Unity–1949 As the middle of the twentieth century approaches, the shores of a possible New Europe may be dimly seen. In the comparatively new city of Washington, representatives of twelve nations have signed the epochal North Atlantic pact; in the ancient city of Strasbourg, where Germanic and French culture meet, a Council of Europe, conceived in the age old hope of unity for Europe, will shortly convene; and at Berlin, the broken hub of the Continent, the stark symbol of a divided Europe is about to be lifted. Since the war, Europe, reduced to the Western Peninsula, overshadowed by non-European power, has revived its secular aspirations for unity. …The American relation to this trend will be vital. In its step-by-step progression the movement toward unity must presently come up against great problems, central to European destiny, but which are not entirely European problems. They begin with a recognition by America of the West Europe of the Twentieth Century; a Europe containing large areas of social- ism and dirigisme; a Europe still in a state of shock; a Europe in debt for dollars for some time to come; a Europe which must be temporarily budgeted for in American budgets, and partly armed from American stocks; and a Europe as an essential outpost of American security. — American Foreign Service Journal Editorial, May 1949 The Future of NATO–1963 For a year or more statements have been coming from various French sources implying that the North Atlantic Treaty expires, or must be renewed, or must be modified, in 1969. None of these things is true. The Treaty is of indefinite or perpetual duration, although any party may withdraw after the Treaty has been in effect 20 years, i.e., after August 24, 1969. … From the political rather than the legal point of view it is all too probable that as 1969 approaches there will be louder and more insistent threats from Paris to withdraw from the Treaty unless radical changes are made in its organization. Whether France would go so far as actually to withdraw unilaterally will depend upon many factors during the next three years, including developments in East-West relations, the attitude of various gov- ernments, notably the U.S., and whether or not [French President Charles] de Gaulle is still in power. ON NATO AT 70 FOCUS THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | APRIL 2019 35

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