The Foreign Service Journal, April 2019

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | APRIL 2019 53 A Master of Process Kissinger the Negotiator: Lessons from Dealmaking at the Highest Level James K. Sebenius, R. Nicholas Burns and Robert H. Mnookin, Foreword by Henry A. Kissinger, HarperCollins, 2018, $28.99/hardcover; $17.99/paperback; $14.99/Kindle, 411 pages. Reviewed by Harry W. Kopp If encounters with car salesmen, real- estate agents or divorce lawyers leave you feeling like a chump, there are plenty of books that claim to offer help. Some are good ( Getting to Yes by Fisher and Ury), some are so-so ( You Can Negotiate Anything by Herb Cohen) and some are entertaining trash ( The Art of the Deal by you-know-who). But if your encounters are with the likes of North Korea, the Group of Seven, representatives of the Taliban, the countries with claims in the South China Sea, the Venezuelan opposition, the Palestinian Authority or the U.S. agencies responsible for trade policy, you need more serious advice. You will find no bet- ter teacher than Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, as deciphered, demystified and distilled in this work of 400 pages. Kissinger, national security adviser (1969-1975) and Secretary of State (1973- 1977) under Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald Ford, led the most complex and far-reaching negotiations of the mid-20th century. Over his eight years in government, the talks he led held in bal- ance hundreds of thousands of human lives and the fate of nations. The results of his efforts, as this book acknowledges, are even now subject to fierce debate. Results, however, hold little interest for the authors of Kissinger the Nego- tiator . Skilled negotiators, they say, may produce bad results, either through faulty assumptions (“Any negotiation depends on the quality of the assumptions that led to undertaking it in the first place”) or flawed intent (“Technical virtuosity says nothing about whether the objectives of the negotiator are good or evil, wise or foolish”). They draw their lessons from Kiss- inger’s failures as well as his successes. Their real interest is in process, and their regard for Kissinger as a master of process borders on awe. This is an academic, specifically a Harvard, book. Henry Kissinger was a doctoral student at Harvard and a mem- ber of the faculty for 15 years before entering public service. The three co- authors, James K. Sebenius, R. Nicholas Burns and Robert H. Mnookin, are pro- fessors at Harvard’s schools of business, government, and law, respectively. Professor Sebenius has top bill- ing on the title page, but the spirit and diplomatic sensibility of Ambassador Burns, Foreign Service officer (retired) and former under secretary of State, are evident on every page. The authors infer Kissinger’s methodology from detailed analysis of the common elements in a number of very differ- ent negotiations, including those with Israel and its Arab neighbors; with China and the Soviet Union; with North Vietnam; and, most interesting and informative, the little- remembered talks in and about Southern Africa in 1976 and 1977. The authors confirmed and deepened their conclusions in discus- sions with Kissinger himself. Kissinger’s Method In these days of chaos, impulse and posturing, Kissinger’s preparation and discipline refresh and astound. Negotia- tions began with an objective or set of objectives, carefully elaborated at the presidential level and part of a general strategy for America in the world. The authors cite Brent Scowcroft, the Air Force general who followed Kissinger as national security adviser: “[Kissinger] could balance a whole lot of disparate issues and interrelate them all a year or two on. Several years later, all the strands would come together.” The objective might be narrowly drawn (e.g., prevent a Soviet-backed guerrilla “race war” in Rhodesia and South Africa), or it might be quite broad (e.g., position the United States to be closer to both China and the Soviet Union than either was to the other). From the objective, Kissinger “mapped backward” to design a sequence of steps leading to the desired result. He conducted deep, meticulous research to understand the interests and motivations of the parties involved, the personalities and psychology of the principal actors, and the way these ele- ments might interact. He relied for this work on professional During negotiations, Kissinger would repeatedly “zoom out” to re-examine objectives in light of shifting conditions, and “zoom in” to particular issues and individuals that required attention. BOOKS