The Foreign Service Journal, April 2019

54 APRIL 2019 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL staff. In preparation for talks in southern Africa, for example, the authors say he “rebuilt the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs, staffing it with trusted diplomats.” And Kissinger himself wrote in his memoirs: “[W]hen I came to Wash- ington, I assembled a group [of] … really young, able, dedicated people. I would meet with them several times a week, preferably daily, asking the question, what are we trying to do? What is our strategy in the world?” Kissinger drew his staff mainly from the Foreign Service, academia and established foreign-affairs think-tanks. During negotiations, Kissinger would repeatedly “zoom out” to re-examine objectives in light of shifting conditions, and “zoom in” to particular issues and individuals that required attention. At the negotiating table, he was able to combine empathy and assertiveness to convey that he had a clear under- standing of his interlocutor’s position and political needs, while remaining insistent on his own desired outcome. He was quick to adapt to changing circumstances: the authors offer the maxim, “Think strategically, but act opportunistically.” He paid “special attention to the close relationship of force and negotiation.” The authors quote Kissinger’s 2016 inter- view with Jeffrey Goldberg: “Diplomacy and power are not discrete activities. … The opposite number in a negotiation needs to know there is a breaking point at which you will attempt to impose your will. Otherwise there will be a deadlock or a diplomatic defeat.” The threat of force depends in large part on credibility, another of Kissing- er’s touchstones. “Simply put,” say the authors, “one’s credibility is the belief by others that one’s threats and prom- ises will be carried out.” The Role of Secrecy Away from the table, Kissinger often worked with third parties to broaden the scope of the negotiations and change the calculus of risk for the primary participants. During talks with North Vietnam, for example, Kissinger tried, tirelessly but in vain, to bring about Soviet pressure on Hanoi to accommo- date U.S. needs. He tried, as well, to shore up domestic support for his negotiating positions, an effort seriously hampered by his strong preference for conducting his most important negotiations in secret. Secrecy excluded not only the public but also the U.S. government below the level of the president. Kissinger under- stood the costs of maintaining secrecy, among them the risk of exposure, which could lead to charges of duplicity and bad faith; a loss of technical expertise; and confusion when (as occurred during disarmament talks with the Soviet Union) secret negotiations and back-channel messages came into conflict with posi- tions taken in parallel discussions under way in normal diplomatic channels. But secrecy gave Kissinger agility and personal control. So long as he held the president’s confidence, secrecy allowed him to move quickly and decisively, exploring lines of inquiry that would never have survived an interagency clear- ance process. The trade-off, he judged, was worth it. Kissinger the Negotiator seems intended for classroom use. The authors from time to time break their narrative to insert a bulleted list, box or diagram to explain, summarize and drive home the points they particularly want the reader to absorb. The techniques and principles they describe, they say, extend beyond diplomacy “to business, legal and any other subjects characterized by complex negotiations,” although they offer no examples. They close the book with a handy list of 15 one-sentence LESSONS [sic], which offer help even for that dread encoun- ter with the car salesman: “LESSON 12: Reconsider the traditional ‘start high, concede slowly’ approach.” Do not be put off by this blatant pedagogy, or by the authors’ deliberately amoral analysis. Kissinger the Negotia- tor rewards close study. It is impossible to come away from this book without a deeper appreciation of the seriousness, complexity and consequential weight of diplomatic negotiations and, if one is a diplomat oneself, a deeper gratitude for the opportunity to be entrusted with their conduct. n Harry W. Kopp, a former Foreign Service officer, served as deputy assistant secretary of State for international trade policy in the Carter and Reagan administrations. He is the author of several books on diplomacy, including (with John K. Naland) Career Diplomacy: Life and Work in the U.S. For- eign Service , recently published in a third edition by Georgetown University Press, and Voice of the Foreign Service: A History of the American Foreign Service Association (FS Books, 2015). He is a frequent Journal contributor and a member of the FSJ Edito- rial Board. It is impossible to come away from this book without a deeper appreciation of the seriousness, complexity and consequential weight of diplomatic negotiations.