The Foreign Service Journal, April 2023

34 APRIL 2023 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL They were, however, perfectly content to pretend to negoti- ate. Over the ensuing years, therefore, the “peace process” would fruitlessly reinvent itself several times, with involvement eventu- ally expanding to CAR’s neighbors, the African Union, and finally the Russians. Yet there was never any prospect of a durable peace “deal” as long as no force capable of enforcing it existed. The international community did not consistently counter the destabilizing agendas of CAR’s neighbors. Both Sudan and Chad not only sought to profit fromCAR’s economic assets (gold, diamonds, and cattle), but manipulated the cross-border move- ments of armed groups for their own political purposes. Chad’s late president, Idriss Déby, in particular, strove to be a political kingmaker in CAR, and his opportunistic support for the armed groups, although never explicit, made it easier for them to with- stand outside pressure. Unfortunately, the international community mostly ignored the neighbors’ contribution to CAR’s instability. Partly it was because the world had larger fish to fry with those two countries. Partly, however, it was simply a function of bureaucratic discon- nect—Western officials working on CAR were often not the same ones who were responsible for Chad and Sudan, and the concerns of the former were not those of the latter. Most importantly, the international community failed to build a political partnership with the CAR government. From the beginning, the international community was reluctant to be too closely tied to the Central African Armed Forces (FACA), partly to maintain its posture of neutrality toward all the “parties to the conflict” and partly because of legitimate worries about FACA’s professionalism. Training, yes; support for FACA deployments, no. The truth, however, was that a strong FACA was critical to sta- bilization success. After all, if MINUSCA could not impose order, the only plausible option was for the Central African security forces to play that role. At a minimum, a stronger national army would have put pressure on the warlords to take peace negotia- tions more seriously. The election in 2015 of a new president, Faustin Touadéra, offered the perfect opportunity for a new security partnership between the international community and the government. Having won handily in what all observers agreed was a free and fair election, Touadéra offered a partner with real legitimacy. Moreover, he was eager to demonstrate to the population that he could get the FACA out into the field and become a force for better security. To do that, he needed support from the international community. Unfortunately, a deal was never made. Touadéra wanted the international community to provide arms and logistical support to the army quickly; the international community resisted, insisting that various reforms had to come first. Both sides had arguments on their side, but the impasse dragged into months and then years. If the international community had hoped to push him toward better governance by withholding its support, it was mis- taken. Weakened politically, he instead leaned ever more heavily on a corrupt and highly partisan political circle—and began to search for a new outside partner. Enter Russia By 2017, not only Touadéra but much of population was disil- lusioned by the lack of progress toward peace. The international community’s massive presence and profile made it easy to blame. It was a perfect opportunity for Russia to exploit. Beginning with a shipment of Russian arms, the relationship rapidly expanded, with a grateful President Touadéra accepting first military trainers, In Bangui, on July 18, 2014, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General Laurence Wohlers is interviewed after the ceremony launching the disarmament and relocation project of 2,000 ex-Seleka combatants. U.N.PHOTO/CATIANNETIJERINA