The Foreign Service Journal, May 2004

to mount a major peacekeeping operation to ensure the success of the agreement. A robust intervention, if it were to take place, would represent a significant depar- ture from previous reluctance to engage decisively in big states. The international community needs a new approach to the problems of large African states. Allowing their problems to fester, the case all too often in the past, is a source of continuing hardship to their citizens and neigh- bors alike. The theoretical commitment to the territorial integrity of these large states does not help them stay together. Classic U.N. or other international interven- tions are almost impossible in large countries, because the resources of personnel and finances required are pro- hibitive, sapping the already scant political will of the pos- sible intervenors. Analyzing Dysfunctionality Africa’s big states, with the exception of South Africa, are dysfunctional politically, economically and socially. In the present conditions, these states do not serve the inter- ests of their citizens, their neighbors, or the broader international community. Despite the advantage for growth that large states with large domestic markets should theoretically enjoy, Africa’s three most populous countries — Nigeria, Ethiopia and the DRC — have average per capita income under $300 a year, virtually unchanged in the last 20 years and representing a substantial decline in real income and living conditions for most citizens. Yet, Nigeria and the DRC are mineral-rich countries, and oil production in Nigeria has increased and continues to increase rapidly. Such per capita income is well below the average for sub-Saharan Africa, which has increased slightly to about $1,000 in the last 20 years. Even more striking, per capita income in countries with fewer than two million inhabitants has shown steady if unspectacular growth for the last 15 years and now tops $2,000. Including other indicators of welfare, such as those mea- sured by the U.N. Human Development Index, only con- firms the conclusion that big African states do very little for the welfare of their citizens. These states have not been much kinder to their lead- ers, and small states are not dramatically different in this regard. Although some of the leaders have amassed huge fortunes while in power, most have not been able to remain in power very long and have been removed from office by force rather than by regular elections. Sudan and Nigeria top the list, each with 11 leadership turnovers since 1960. The DRC had eight turnovers, concentrated in the initial years of the republic and after 1998, with a long stretch under Mobutu Sese Seko in between. Ethiopia has experienced five turnovers. Only Angola has managed to avoid turnovers — when the first president died of natural causes, succession took place within the party. Even the UNITA opposition movement had unusually stable leadership under Jonas Savimbi. The most serious dysfunctionality has affected the state itself. The big African states have so far not suc- ceeded in establishing political and administrative sys- tems capable of coping with the challenge posed by their size. They remain poorly governed and even more poor- ly administered. The political failure has received the most attention. It is reflected in the civil wars that have afflicted all five countries at some point, and continue to afflict the DRC and Sudan. Angola was at war from its independence in 1975 until 2002, and the situation has barely stabilized even now. Ethiopia experienced war in Eritrea from the early 1960s until 1991, with conflict spreading to other regions during the 1980s. The conflict only ended with the recognition of Eritrean independence in 1991. Nigeria experienced civil war from May 1967 when the eastern region declared independence as Biafra until January 1970, when the defeated Biafra was reintegrated in the federation. War in the DRC started in 1998 and continues, notwithstanding multiple agreements and ongoing discussions. Sudan may be on the verge of an agreement to end the war that started in 1983 — the sec- ond round of a conflict whose first round lasted from 1956 to 1972. Even if the agreement is signed, however, the problem of Sudanese statehood will not be solved for good. Six years after the signing of the proposed agree- ment, Sudan is supposed to hold a referendum in which citizens will decide whether the country will remain unit- ed or whether the south will secede. The fact that nei- ther side has been defeated militarily adds to the possi- bility that the conflict will resume. These conflicts reveal the failure of big African states to reconcile their internal political, ethnic, and religious differences and to establish a political system capable of accommodating the demands and interests of various groups. It is these internal failures, rather than the inter- ventions by outsiders pursuing their own agenda, that F O C U S 28 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A Y 2 0 0 4