The Foreign Service Journal, May 2004

military officers were fully aware that our lack of cultural and language capability would seriously limit the utility of modern arms, particularly in non-traditional warfare. They there- fore requested force levels higher than they otherwise would have. Yet the White House rejected the requests, citing the ability of our troops to destroy all conventional mil- itary resistance in Iraq. But the administration neglected to take into account the importance of destroying or forcing the surrender and disband- ing of Iraqi units in place and securing weapons and ammunition dumps to ensure that most Iraqis perceived the likelihood of successful unconven- tional warfare as poor. It also ignored the reality that terrorism and uncon- ventional warfare are the logical by- products of overwhelming military inferiority. The other side of the threat assessment coin is formulating an appropriate response. Just as even the best analysts sometimes either overestimate or underestimate potential threats, policy-makers tend to favor the use of force to keep other countries from assessing U.S. decision-makers as weak or uncer- tain. American military dominance has resulted in both the overuse of mili- tary force and errors in how we have applied it. Overuse is a natural result of being able to use military force in almost any scenario; as the saying goes, when you have a hammer, every problem looks like a nail. But it also reflects the desire for quick solutions to complex problems, and the political reality that the use of military force builds short- to midterm political sup- port at the polls. The potential for error exists in large part because there are major disconnects in our system between global political, economic, social and political-military knowledge and national decision-making power. America’s foreign and strategic poli- cy decision-making structures are so complex and multi-layered, and actual “on-the ground” knowledge is so far removed from those with deci- sion-making authority, that serious mistakes are inevitable. The col- lapse of the Soviet Union and its empire from within is an excellent example of this type of structural problem. The Soviet centralized economic planning system worked reasonably well when the system it ran was a relatively simple one. But as the Soviet Union became eco- nomically mature and far more com- plex, centralized planning became incapable of meeting the varied tasks it faced. A similar reality is faced by American foreign policy today, with a potentially parallel outcome. Then there is the problem of developing the human resources nec- essary for maintaining a global empire. After all, “smart” weapons systems are only as “smart” as those who operate them. It is exceptionally difficult to identify, track and destroy irregular forces and terrorists when you don’t speak the local language or understand the local norms and mores — much less the broader cul- ture and its complicated subcultures. What was true in Vietnam 35 years ago is just as true today in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet no administration has been willing to commit the funds to ensure that U.S. diplomats, intelli- gence operatives and military forces have adequate linguistic, cultural and area-specific skills. Despite our relative under-invest- ment in these areas, our military, intelligence and diplomatic services have amassed an immense amount of knowledge (especially compared to what the political leadership of the day possesses). But power rivalries at both the political and bureaucratic levels and complex hierarchical struc- tures work to keep knowledge and power apart. The longtime rivalry between the FBI and the CIA was one of the main factors that prevented solid intelligence about terrorist train- ing in U.S. flight schools from cutting through multiple levels of bureaucra- cy and preventing the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Following 9/11, top Defense Department officials chose to confine decision-making and intelligence assessment with respect to Iraq to a small group of like-thinking individu- als (the “Office of Special Plans”). The result was that policy was made in secret by individuals with only a limited knowledge of the region, who never allowed their recommenda- tions to face the open and ongoing scrutiny of the entire intelligence community (much less the political system). The outcome demonstrated manifold errors. There were no weapons of mass destruction. The assumption that Iraqi Arabs would warmly welcome the U.S., particular- ly given our longstanding support for Israel, failed to stand up in the light of day. Exiled Iraqis were not warmly welcomed upon their return. The assumption that Iraq’s clan structure — where nepotism is a virtue, not a vice — is amenable to democracy appears to be either a misguided assumption or a cynical ploy. Finally, the administration’s insis- 58 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A Y 2 0 0 4 U.S. policy-makers have ignored President Eisenhower’s warning about the dangers posed by the “military- industrial complex.”