The Foreign Service Journal, May 2005

I s the United States making the same mistakes in its search for partners in the “war on terror” as it did during the Cold War? During that earlier global conflict, the United States pursued alliances with govern- ments, militaries and rebel groups, even those whose policies and activi- ties were in conflict with core American values and the goals we professed to be promoting in our struggle against the Soviet Union. The list of unsavory regimes Washing- ton courted and counted as allies is long and notorious. It includes the merely corrupt, such as the Marcos kleptocracy in the Philippines, as well as some which were savagely brutal, such as Shah Pahlevi’s dictatorship in Iran. And some, such as Indonesia’s despotic Suharto regime, were both corrupt and brutal. The political costs of these alli- ances continue to burden U.S. poli- cies and interests today. We see the baggage in fractured societies like the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Haiti, where decades of U.S.-sup- ported misrule have impaired the development of stable, democratic governments. Our interventions have also left legacies of deep resentment among local populations around the world, including Iran, Iraq and much of Central America. Despite that history, since the 9/11 attacks Washington once again has sought out allies whose corruption, human rights abuses and undemocra- tic records render them pariahs in the international community. These include the Karimov regime in Uzbe- kistan, which routinely employs tor- ture against opponents; the Mush- arraf regime in Pakistan, where democratic progress has been thwart- ed by the president/general; and the Indonesian military, the “Tentara Nasional Indonesia.” In late Feb- ruary, Secretary Rice announced that the U.S. would resume International Military Education and Training assis- tance to Jakarta, overturning a 14-year congressional ban imposed to protest the TNI’s human rights abuses, oper- ation of criminal “business enterpris- es” and lack of accountability to civilian authorities. This action was not a surprise, to be sure. Last year, the Bush adminis- tration convinced Congress to adopt new criteria for restoration of IMET assistance that were far looser than the restrictions authored by Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt. Specifically, Congress agreed that restoration of IMET (though not Foreign Military Sales assistance) could be triggered by a State Department certification that the government of Indonesia and the TNI were rendering “full coopera- tion” to an FBI investigation of the Aug. 31, 2002, killing of two U.S. citi- zens and wounding of many more in Timika, West Papua. Pursuant to that authority, Sec. Rice formally confirmed Indonesian “cooperation” on Feb. 27, 2005. She did so despite the failure of the Indonesian authorities to detain the one person thus far indicted for those crimes by a U.S. grand jury, and despite an eight-month hiatus in the FBI investigation, during which our agents have still not been invited back to Indonesia to resume the case. A History of Brutality Even if one accepts claims of Indonesian cooperation at face value, this decision ignores the TNI’s broad- er record, which remains indefensi- ble. In Southeast Asia, that record is rivaled for sheer brutality only by the murderous Khmer Rouge. From 1965 to 1968 alone, the Indonesian military engineered the slaughter of more than a half-million of its own compatriots, following an alleged “coup” attempt against President Sukarno. Employing a tactic it would resort to again and again, the TNI allied itself with Islamic forces that did much of the actual killing. The Suharto regime, which rose to power as a consequence of the coup and which directed the massive killings, sought to justify them in American eyes by labeling the victims as “com- munists.” Following the Indonesian mili- Until the Indonesian military ceases to be a rogue institution and a threat to democracy, the U.S. should maintain its ban on IMET assistance. Making a Tragic Mistake in Indonesia B Y E DMUND M C W ILLIAMS M A Y 2 0 0 5 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 15 S PEAKING O UT