The Foreign Service Journal, May 2005

ground on key security and political issues such as the glob- al war on terrorism and North Korea’s nuclear weapons pro- gram. Conversely, those who are distrustful of the People’s Republic of China point to a long list of contentious ques- tions involving security con- cerns, political values, economic competition and sovereignty questions — most notably, its rapid acquisition of advanced military equipment, largely designed to deter Washington from intervening should China and Taiwan clash. In fact, since the end of the Cold War, China has been the only large power to con- tinue building and buying weapons that could be used against the United States. Although Washington and Beijing both tend to see their national interests best served by pragmatic coop- eration, the background and values of their respective leaderships vividly reflect their very different political systems and experiences. And in an open society like the United States, it is often easy for members of Congress, backed by the media, interest groups and other advocates, to focus on the many glaring differ- ences in the goals and motives of the two countries. This is not a new develop- ment, to be sure: Domestic fac- tors have often strongly influ- enced U.S. policy toward the PRC, with Congress serving as the main arena for the policy debate. There were some occa- sions, notably in the 1960s, when Americans seeking improved re- lations with China used lobbying and hearings in Congress to pro- mote better U.S.-China ties. More typical was the pattern seen during the Chinese Civil War following World War II, in the early years of the Cold War, during the normalization of U.S.-PRC rela- tions in the late 1970s and early 1980s and, again, in the decade after the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown. During those periods, Congress reflected a wide range of American interests opposed to, or wary of, the commu- nist leaders of China. Backed by those interests, Congress seriously complicated and constrained U.S. government efforts to develop improved relations with the PRC. The Capitol Hill Roller Coaster Given this history, it is important that administration policy-makers with responsibility for managing rela- tions with Beijing take careful account of Congress and how it might influence policy toward China. At a min- imum, they need to be aware of the strength of possi- ble resistance emerging from Congress — which has generally been an accurate barometer of overall Ameri- can domestic opinion — to prevailing administration policy toward the PRC. For example, there was broad support in Congress for President Nixon’s initial opening to Beijing in 1972. But just a few years later, Capitol Hill functioned as a powerful brake on efforts by the Carter administration to loosen ties with Taiwan and move closer to the PRC as a way of pressuring the Soviet Union. Congress went along more smoothly with the subsequent re- evaluation of U.S.-China relations in 1983 conducted by Secretary of State George Shultz, with the assistance of Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Paul Wolfowitz and Deputy Assistant F O C U S M A Y 2 0 0 5 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 25 Robert Sutter has been a visiting professor of Asian studies in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University since 2001. Prior to that, Dr. Sutter special- ized in Asian and Pacific affairs and U.S. foreign policy during a government career spanning 33 years, including a variety of analytical and supervisory positions with the Library of Congress for over 20 years. He has also worked for the Central Intelligence Agency, Department of State, Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the National Intelligence Council. Dr. Sutter has held adjunct faculty positions with Georgetown, George Washington and Johns Hopkins Universities and the University of Virginia. He has pub- lished 14 books including, most recently, China’s Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils (Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), numerous articles and several hundred govern- ment reports dealing with contemporary East Asian and Pacific countries and their relations with the United States. Partisan interests and the influence of constituent groups played a greater role in the U.S.-China policy debate of the 1990s than in the 1970s.