The Foreign Service Journal, May 2005

Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage. That policy shift low- ered the priority of China in U.S. foreign policy and slowed forward movement in Sino-American rela- tions, but did not hinder closer economic and commercial ties over the rest of the 1980s. Following the Tiananmen Square crackdown and end of the Cold War, Congress sought to drive U.S. policy in directions of sometimes intense opposition to China. President George H.W. Bush exerted extraor- dinary efforts to preserve basic trade and other relations, and to block more extreme congressional initiatives. While it is not clear that Bush’s handling of the issue was a significant factor in his election defeat in 1992, then- Governor William Clinton harshly criticized the presi- dent and China throughout the campaign. Once in office, however, President Clinton exerted little leadership on China policy, and for several years major decisions were played out among competing interests in congressional debates regarding the pros and cons of setting strong conditions on renewing U.S. most-favored-nation trade status for China. Buffeted by strong congressional and domestic pressures, President Clinton twice reversed longstanding U.S. policy — first by delinking MFN renewal from human rights conditions in China in May 1994, and then by granting a visa to Taiwan’s president to visit America in May 1995. The latter move sparked a major U.S. mili- tary confrontation with Beijing that prompted Clinton to take tight hold of China policy, thereafter pursuing a policy of constructive engagement designed to avoid major downturns and conflict in the relationship. This shift was highly controversial not only with the new, largely pro-Taiwan Republican majority in Congress, but among U.S. media and the wide range of U.S. domestic interests critical of China. It precipitated an intense debate that served as a serious impediment to forward movement and productive U.S. relations with the PRC for the remainder of the decade. The furor did not subside until President George W. Bush was elected with a policy outlook more in line with congressional wariness of China, and the 9/11 ter- rorist attacks on America diverted critical U.S. atten- tion from China. Congress notab- ly did not intervene forcefully in the U.S.-China negotiations con- ducted by the Bush administra- tion following the April 1, 2001, crash between a Chinese jet fighter and a U.S. reconnaissance plane over the South China Sea, the emergency landing of the U.S. plane on China’s Hainan Island, China’s refusal to release the U.S. crew for 11 days, and its holding of the damaged U.S. aircraft for many weeks. The issue was left for the Bush administration to resolve, and congres- sional reaction to the administration’s arrangements regarding the crew’s release and the subsequent release of the damaged plane was muted. The Break with Taiwan There have been two major episodes in which con- gressional resistance complicated administration policy toward China: the opposition to Carter’s 1979 decision to move away from Taiwan and toward the PRC, and anti-PRC sentiment following the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. Assessing the determinants of con- gressional opposition and debate in those periods sheds light on the likelihood of future problems from this quarter for administration policy-makers and suggests options for the executive branch to use in addressing them. The congressional debate in the late 1970s and early 1980s involved important tangible costs and benefits for the United States. The U.S. strategic posture vis-à- vis the Soviet Union and the future of Taiwan headed the list of the serious issues at stake for the United States. Reflecting deep uncertainty about U.S. power and purpose in world affairs, U.S. administration lead- ers, backed by some in Congress, were prepared to make major sacrifices (notably, the unprecedented ter- mination of official relations and a defense treaty with a loyal ally), in order to pursue closer relations with China as a way of triangulating against the USSR. But they were strongly resisted by many members of Congress, who either saw the policy as misguided or who found its costs too great. The fact that the Democratic-controlled Congress F O C U S 26 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A Y 2 0 0 5 Barring an unanticipated crisis, Sino-American relations seem likely to continue along the track of pragmatic cooperation over the next few years.