The Foreign Service Journal, May 2005

ular basis, and a large number of joint working groups have been established. China and Russia alone have set up 35 such bilateral groups. Engagement between China and ASEAN is even more impressive. Over the last few years, the two have undertaken a series of steps to broaden and strengthen their relationship, several of which have considerable sig- nificance for the international relations of the Asian region. Separate protocols have been concluded between China and ASEAN in the areas of human resource devel- opment, public health, information and communication technology, transportation, development assistance, the environment, cultural and academic exchanges, and code- velopment of the Mekong River Basin. At their landmark summit in 2002, China and ASEAN signed four key agreements: the Declaration on Conduct in the South China Sea; the Joint Declaration on Cooperation in the Field of Nontraditional Security Issues; the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation; and the Memorandum of Understanding on Agricultural Cooperation. At their 2003 summit, China formally acceded to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, becoming the first non-ASEAN state to do so (India subsequently fol- lowed suit). This unprecedented step binds China to the core elements of ASEAN’s 1967 charter. Together with the Declaration on Conduct in the South China Sea, the ASEAN treaty formally commits China to enforcing the principles of nonaggression and noninterference, as well as a variety of other conflict resolution mechanisms. At the same summit, ASEAN and China signed the Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity, which addresses a wide range of political, social, economic and security issues. At their 2004 summit, Premier Wen put forward two further initiatives: (1) to build upon the 2001 Framework Agreement on Economic Cooperation and Establishment of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area to create a similar free trade area in East Asia; and (2) to establish an East Asian community (presumably composed only of ASEAN + 3 countries) to discuss political and other issues. Perhaps the accord of greatest significance is the above-mentioned 2001 Framework Agreement, which was amended at the 2002 summit. This agreement has done much to address concerns among Southeast Asian states about their economies and exports being potential- ly eclipsed by China’s. With total ASEAN-China trade growing rapidly (from $45.6 billion in 2002 to $78.2 billion in 2003), Premier Wen has set $100 billion as the target for 2005. In addition, he estimates that when the free trade area takes full effect in 2010, its member states will likely have a combined population of 2 billion people and a collective gross domestic product of $3 trillion. There is little doubt that there are tremendous economic comple- mentarities between China and ASEAN, as well as redun- dancies, and that trade and investment can be expected to grow healthily in coming years. Erasing a Painful History China and ASEAN are forging a productive and lasting relationship that is gradually erasing a history built on widespread suspicion, painful memories, and lingering tensions. China’s efforts to improve its ties with ASEAN are not merely part of a larger “charm offensive.” They represent, in some cases, fundamental compromises that China has chosen to make in limiting its own sovereign interests for the sake of engagement in multilateral frame- works and pursuit of greater regional interdependence. Neither have the Southeast Asian states entered into these arrangements with eyes closed; they believe that China’s rise is inevitable and that the best strategy for ASEAN, to hedge against potentially disruptive or domi- neering behavior, is to entangle the dragon in as many ways as possible. China is clearly aware of its difficult history with its Southeast Asian neighbors. For example, in a major [2001] study of post–Cold War ASEAN policy toward China, leading Chinese Southeast Asia experts reflect can- didly on China’s past interventions in the region and the distrust they bred. The study cites a number of painful legacies that China needs to directly address, including its attempts to export “leftist” ideology to the region during the Cultural Revolution, its support for armed communist insurgencies and coups against established governments, its political manipulation of overseas Chinese (huaqiao), and memories of Southeast Asian tributary relations with imperial China. It also notes the ill will created in the post–Cold War period by China’s “uncompromising” stance on the South China Sea and Taiwan issues, the determination to mod- ernize the Chinese military, and the economic challenges that a “South China economic circle” (composed of Southern China, Hong Kong and Taiwan) poses to ASEAN economies. The study correctly notes that to F O C U S 32 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A Y 2 0 0 5