The Foreign Service Journal, May 2005

The influence of this academic training on future gen- erations of Asian elites will be difficult to measure with any precision, but their experiences while in China will certainly sensitize them to Chinese viewpoints and inter- ests. In addition, they will possess knowledge of the Chinese language, as well as Chinese society, culture, his- tory and politics. Those who enter officialdom may be more accommodating of Chinese interests and demands. They will also share personal connections with former classmates and will move up through professional hierar- chies simultaneously. Strategic Partnerships and Bilateral Ties China’s new diplomatic posture has produced a bliz- zard of meetings and exchanges among Chinese officials and their counterparts (both civilian and military) in neighboring countries. Summits with heads of state from virtually all of China’s neighbors occur annually, and min- isterial and subministerial exchanges are commonplace. China is also posting many of its most seasoned diplomats to ambassadorships in key regional capitals, where they are becoming very active and well known in local com- munities. Lower-ranking Chinese diplomats are fanning out across many Asian countries to attend academic and policy-related seminars, to forge business ties, to cultivate overseas Chinese communities, to provide interviews to local media, and to try to create good will. Long gone are the days of inept and indoctrinated Chinese diplomats cut off from their resident societies. … China has also raised its profile in meetings with regional leaders. This new embrace of regional multi- lateralism was highlighted by China’s hosting of the 2001 APEC meeting in Shanghai and the attention given President Hu Jintao at the 2003 APEC meeting in Bangkok. Another example of China’s efforts to raise its profile was Beijing’s hosting of the Third International Conference of Asian Political Parties on Sept. 3–5, 2004. The meeting, organized by the International Department of the Chinese Communist Party, brought together 350 delegates from 81 political parties in 35 Asian countries, including eight heads of state. On the last day of the conference, the convoca- tion agreed on a 12-point Beijing declaration of princi- ples and areas of cooperation. China’s desire to improve its regional relations is per- haps most clearly demonstrated with regard to three states with which it had minimal interaction (even hostile relations) not too long ago: South Korea, Vietnam and India. China and South Korea. In little more than a decade since diplomatic relations were established in 1992, China’s relations with the Republic of Korea have been dramatically transformed: the prime ministers of the two countries now hold reciprocal summits every year, minis- terial-level officials interact regularly, and even the two militaries increasingly consult and exchange personnel. China is currently South Korea’s largest trading partner, while South Korea ranks third in China’s trade profile. Trade between the two nations totaled $63.2 billion in 2003. South Korea is China’s fifth largest foreign direct investor. More than a million South Koreans visited China in 2003, while 490,000 Chinese made visits to South Korea. There are currently 60,000 long-term South Korean residents in China. ... Approximately 10,000 South Korean companies operate in China, with many having representative offices in addition to production facilities in the country. Each week 700 flights shuttle back and forth between the two countries. South Korean businessmen regularly fly to China for the day and return by evening. Shipping and communications links are also numerous. China’s strategy for building ties with South Korea has both an economic motive and a strategic dimension. In the early 1990s, Chinese strategists concluded that China would have little leverage in shaping the eventual out- come of the divided Korean Peninsula if it did not enjoy strong ties with South Korea. Improved ties would also offset any potential threat to China from the U.S.–South Korean alliance and presence of U.S. forces on the penin- sula. Further, a more robust Chinese–South Korean rela- tionship would blunt any attempt by Japan to gain a stronger foothold on the peninsula. Beijing’s strategy has been a net success for Chinese strategic interests; the bourgeoning relationship has greatly benefited both coun- tries, and it has become a central element in the evolving balance of power in Northeast Asia. The strong state of bilateral ties has also been a key factor in forging the Six- Party Talks (hosted by China) concerning North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. Beijing and Seoul have con- verging and closely coordinated positions in the talks. Despite the overall strength of Chinese–South Korean relations, disagreement over a recent historical interpreta- tion of the ancient kingdom of Koguryo (37 B.C.. to A.D. 668) has created some tension. Assertions in 2003 by Chinese historians that the ancient kingdom was part of F O C U S 34 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A Y 2 0 0 5