The Foreign Service Journal, May 2005

F O C U S 52 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A Y 2 0 0 5 Zhao blames He Dongchang, then head of the educa- tion commission, for interrupting this progress. In a talk to university party secretaries, He said, “Zhao Ziyang’s talk is inconsistent with the spirit of the April 26 editori- al. Parts of his talk are his personal views.” Zhao com- ments, “In fact, he negated my Asian Bank talk. I think there was certainly something behind this. He would not have spoken so boldly on his own. …When He’s talk was disseminated, they [cadres in the education system] uni- versally felt that my talk did not represent the party cen- ter” (p. 572). Matters reached a critical turning point on May 17, 1989. Having quarreled with Li Peng the previous evening, Zhao wrote to Deng demanding a meeting. Deng notified several people — Li Peng, Yao Yilin, Hu Qili, Qiao Shi and Yang Shangkun — to join the meet- ing with him and Zhao. ( The Tiananmen Papers not only lists Bo Yibo as attending this meeting but quotes him as speaking [p. 188]. But according to Zhao Ziyang, Bo was not at the meeting.) As Zhao notes, “Originally it was I who had demanded to talk, but he notified this number of people. Obviously this was not to hear my views” (pp. 575-576). Zhao argued that implementing martial law would have serious consequences, and it would be difficult for him to do so. Zhao recounts, “Hu Qili also opposed military control. Qiao Shi originally had opposed mili- tary control, but at this meeting he approved of it. Yang Shangkun originally opposed military control, but later approved of it. Staunchest [in favor of military control] were Yao [Yilin] and Li [Peng]. In fact, the attitude of these people did not matter. Even if all five people had been opposed, Deng could still have implemented mil- itary control. Prior to the meeting in Deng’s home, my view was in the majority — [Hu] Qili, Qiao Shi, [Yang] Shangkun and I were all unanimous. Prior to this [meeting] they and I had all done a lot of work in accor- dance with this view” (p. 576). But martial law was declared, and Zhao’s career was over. Unfinished Business Speaking now from the grave, Zhao does not let the party off easily. He says, “I believed military con- trol would certainly lead to the use of force. … But the impact of this on the image of the CCP was just too big. ... In 1976, on ‘April 5’ [when people protest- ed the Gang of Four by mourning Zhao Enlai], they only used clubs and workers’ pickets [to clear Tiananmen Square]. The Beijing warlords only killed 10 or so people; in the Dec. 9th movement, Chiang Kai-shek did not dare open fire. Our party has never had this sort of history, so the students did not believe that the PLA would open fire on them. ... Only Deng could have the resolve to use this type of method” (p. 574). In evident frustration, Zhao says: “Later there was an explanation, [saying] that suppression was forced [upon the government], that it had no choice. This view is wrong. There were many opportunities to use methods that would not lead to bloodshed. The crux is that our actions were not correct, our orientation was wrong” (p. 574). Zhao continued, “The explanation that there was no choice but to open fire was something that came later. At first it was said that turmoil needed to be suppressed. Later on, it was said that suppression was the only recourse; it was said that the government adopted an attitude of self-restraint. Who was self- restrained? If it had not been for me working in the middle of things, it would have been done like this long before. Li Peng even told foreigners that we had no rubber bullets” (p. 575). In the end, Zhao asks, “Where were the blackhands? Where was the organization? The leadership? If there had really been an organization and leadership, it would have been easy to deal with. Their leadership was generated at the time, and it even changed on a daily basis” (p. 575). Returning to the question with which Yang Jisheng had opened their first interview, Zhao explained why he never made a self-criticism. “This was my own choice,” he says. “I was the general secretary, and if I had approved of martial law, even at the last moment, I could have continued as general secretary. If I opposed military control, I had to step down. I understood Deng’s personality. Should I continue as general sec- retary by adopting harsh measures against the students, or should I step down? I chose the latter.” Zhao goes on to say: “This situation was not like oth- ers; it was not like doing a self-criticism in past move- ments. In past movements, I have made quite a few self-criticisms. At that time, I thought Chairman Mao was right, and perhaps I was wrong. This includes the Cultural Revolution, when I did a self-criticism like this. This time, I did not see things like this. Of course,