The Foreign Service Journal, May 2005

its internal affairs and inconsistent with the one-China principle. However, it seems to have been mollified by repeated American assurances, such as the testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Stanley Roth before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 25, 1999, that “the U.S. has not and will not support any Taiwan independence move- ment.” On July 9, 1999, in an interview with the Voice of Germany in Taipei, former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui described Taiwan’s relations with China as “spe- cial state to state.” Beijing immediately demanded that Lee cease deviating from the “one China” principle, and threatened to use force if necessary to prevent Taiwan from formally separating from China. But however unpopular Lee’s view was on the mainland, it did not lack supporters back in the U.S. Conservative members of Congress lined up to denounce the PRC’s position. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms, R-N.C., said that “Lee’s statement has presented an opportunity to break free from the anachronistic, Beijing-inspired, one-China policy which has imprisoned U.S. policy for years.” Rep. Benjamin Gilman, R-N.Y., chairman of the House International Relations Commit- tee, warned that unless it protested the PRC’s stance, the U.S. would be conceding that “Beijing is the capital of one China, including Taiwan.” The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, created by Congress to monitor China/ Taiwan/U.S. relations, issued a report last June calling for a reassessment of the “one China” policy, either to abro- gate it altogether or refine it to exclude Taiwan from China because it does not take into account the new real- ities in Taiwan. Nevertheless, the “one China” policy is very much alive. President George W. Bush telephoned Chinese President Hu Jintao from Air Force One last July 31 to repeat “U.S. commitment to a one-China policy and non- support for Taiwan’s independence.” During his October 2004 trip to China, Secretary of State Colin Powell told the press in Beijing that “Taiwan does not enjoy sover- eignty as a nation.” He told Hong Kong’s Phoenix TV: “There is only one China. Taiwan is not independent. It does not enjoy sovereignty as a nation, and that remains our policy, our firm policy.” This longstanding if quietly held U.S. view, not much different from what Kissinger told Zhou in 1971 or what Clinton said about the “three noes” in 1998, caused an uproar in Taipei. State Department officials later clarified Powell’s comments as not being a signal of any change in U.S. policy, which is to encourage both sides to resolve their differences peace- fully via dialogue. The Three Pillars In Beijing’s view, the Shanghai Communiqué of Feb. 28, 1972, the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the U.S. and the PRC of Jan. 1, 1979, and the U.S.-China Communiqué on Arms Sales of Aug. 17, 1982, form the three pillars underlying the complex political and security interplay among China, Taiwan and the United States. (Supporters of the ROC’s claims would argue that the Taiwan Relations Act deserves to be added to that foundation.) It is worth noting that in none of the communiqués does the U.S. ever explicitly state its own position on the future of Taiwan. In the Shanghai Communiqué, the U.S. acknowledges that “all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait claim that there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China ... and the U.S. does not challenge that position” (italics added). In the opinion of some commentators, that acknowledgement did not mean the U.S. agreed, however; nor did it mean that the U.S. expressed its own position. In the 1979 Joint Communiqué, the Chinese text changed “ren shi” (acknowledge) to “cheng ren” (recog- nize). During the debate on the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, Sen. Jacob Javits, R-N.Y., noted the difference, and urged that “we not subscribe to the Chinese position on one China either way.” Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher assured the senators that “we regard the English text as being the binding text.” Three years later, the Communiqué on Arms Sales repeated that the U.S. has no intention of pursuing a policy of “two Chinas or one China, one Taiwan,” reconfirming earlier promis- es of the support of a one-China policy. Testifying before the House International Relations Committee on April 21, 2004, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly delivered a comprehensive explanation of U.S. policy toward Taiwan and China. He emphasized that the U.S. “remains com- mitted to the one-China policy based on the three Joint Communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act. The U.S. does not support independence for Taiwan or unilateral moves that would change the status quo as we define it. F O C U S 60 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A Y 2 0 0 5