The Foreign Service Journal, May 2005

The Bush administration reportedly counseled Beijing not to undertake such a unilateral measure to poison the atmosphere at a time when cross-strait relations seemed to be improving. Speaking at Sophia University in Tokyo on March 19, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said in response: “Our one-China policy is clear and unchanged. We oppose unilateral changes in the status quo, whether by word or deed by either party. Both sides must recog- nize that neither can solve the problem alone. We urge both sides to continue to expand recent steps toward a more productive relationship. And in the interests of peace and stability we stand by our obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act ....” And during a brief stopover in Beijing on March 21, Rice told Chinese leaders that the anti-secession law is “not helpful” in reducing cross-strait tensions. She further reiterated the U.S. commitment to the “one China” principle as enunciated in the three joint communiqués, but added that America will also stand by its obligations to Taiwan under the TRA. For its part, as expected, Taiwan condemned the law as a unilateral provocative act that will further alienate Taiwan from wanting to be united with the mainland. Massive protest demonstrations were staged on the island on March 26. Six Assurances Although the Taiwan Relations Act stipulates that the U.S. will provide defensive arms to help Taiwan defend itself in the event of a Chinese armed attack on the island, it contains no reference to any direct U.S. participation in the conflict. The TRA states only that “the president and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of ... defense articles and ser- vices based solely on their judgment of the needs of Taiwan, in accordance with procedures established by law.” Ever since the law’s passage, Beijing has exerted con- stant pressure on Washington to repeal it as incompatible with the “one China” concept set forth in the previous two joint communiqués. In particular, the PRC vigorously demanded a fixed date for the cessation of American arms sales to Taiwan. According to John Holdridge’s book Cross the Divide (Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), the Chinese foreign minister explicitly threatened that if the U.S. did not respond with a “date certain,” China would downgrade diplomatic relations with the U.S. (as it had already down- graded relations with the Netherlands over the sale of two submarines to Taiwan). However, U.S. negotiators held firm and rejected the Chinese ultimatum. These discus- sions ultimately led to the open-ended formulation used in the 1982 Communiqué on Arms Sales. Not surprisingly, the Taiwanese press directed a heavy stream of editorial invective against the U.S. decision to stop short of explicit guarantees on arms sales to the ROC. In response, Washington eased Taiwan’s anxiety somewhat by informally offering the so-called “Six Assurances” in July 1982. The text of these assurances has long been well known, but has never been publicly delineated in U.S. documents. James Lilley, who was the U.S. chief representative in Taipei at the time, comments in his book China Hands (Public Affairs, 2004) that the Six Assurances cushioned the anxiety and uneasiness of the Taiwan leadership over the Arms Sales Communi- qué. He describes the document as “a personal letter from President Reagan to President Chiang Ching-kuo, in keeping with his warm sentiments for Taiwan.” Testifying before the House International Relations Committee on March 20, 1998, Nat Bellocchi, a former chairman of the American Institute of Taiwan, described the six assurances: • The U.S. does not agree to set a date certain for ending arms sales to Taiwan; • It does not agree to engage in prior consultations with Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan; • The U.S. sees no mediation role for itself in the PRC-ROC dispute; • It has no plans to seek revision of the Taiwan Relations Act; • There has been no change in our longstanding posi- tion on the issue of sovereignty over Taiwan; and • The U.S. will not attempt to exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC. In addition, with regard to Taiwan’s future status, the U.S. government has repeatedly and publicly stated that it is a matter for both sides to decide, with our only stip- ulation being that the resolution must come about through peaceful means. Given the changes of the past 23 years, some may question whether the assurances are still valid and bind- ing. Secretary of State Colin Powell, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 8, 2001, said all Six Assurances, including the future status of Taiwan, remain at the heart of U.S. policy toward the Republic of China. F O C U S 62 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A Y 2 0 0 5