The Foreign Service Journal, May 2005

The Three Noes During his June 1998 summit with President Jiang Zemin in Beijing, President Bill Clinton told the press: “I had a chance to reiterate our Taiwan policy, which is that we don’t support independence for Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one Taiwan–one China. And we don’t believe that Taiwan should be a member of any organization for which statehood is a requirement. So, I think we have a consistent policy. Our only policy has been that we think it has to be done peacefully...” Journalist James Mann, in his book About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton (Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), says that the formulation of the “three noes” can be traced to the promises made by Bill Clinton to Jiang in a personal let- ter delivered by Secretary of State Warren Christopher at a Brunei meeting in August 1995. This letter, which has never been made public, was intended to assure the Chinese president that the U.S. would oppose Taiwan independence, would not support two Chinas or a one China–one Taiwan formula, and would not support Taiwan’s admission to the United Nations. In many respects, the “three noes” statement is sim- ilar to earlier U.S. promises made to China’s leaders. But Clinton’s formulation made clearer the status of Taiwan and what the U.S. would and would not support, by publicly ruling out any outcome that involved inde- pendence for the ROC and membership in any organi- zation for which statehood is required. Accordingly, some in Congress criticized it for supporting Beijing’s assertion of sovereignty over Taiwan and heightening the island’s anxiety over its future. Proceed with Caution The Taiwan Strait remains one of the most likely flash points anywhere in the world today. Fortunately, there have been signs of a deepening understanding by all three parties of the risks conflict would pose, and the need to take even small steps away from the brink. These include the establishment of direct charter flights between China and Taiwan during the recent lunar new year celebration; the cancellation of a military exercise along the Taiwan coast; some progress in the “three links” of direct transportation, communications and trade; ROC President Chen Shui-bian’s recent promis- es not to initiate constitutional reforms touching on politically sensitive issues such as Taiwan’s sovereignty and a name change for the country; and more unequiv- ocal U.S. statements opposing unilateral alteration of the status quo in the area. Despite Beijing’s passage of the anti-secession act and other posturings and provo- cations by both sides, the basic process of reconciliation remains intact. Yet despite the promise of these tentative steps, it is important to bear in mind that the interests of all three governments remain fundamentally different. Two of them are prosperous democracies, while a different two are nuclear states with global interests. Thus, even when all three countries’ policies converge in certain sit- uations, and on specific issues, they don’t do so com- pletely or for long. These competing interests have important implica- tions for U.S. policy, particularly as China departs from the current strategy of domestic development to pursue a proactive, more assertive foreign policy dubbed “peaceful rise.” This policy alarms Beijing’s neighbors, who fear that its rise may not, in fact, be so peaceful, given the PRC’s gigantic economic clout, nuclear status and one-party political system. Over the long term, it is prudent for Washington to avoid the temptation of getting directly involved in mediation or negotiation between Taipei and Beijing. The oft-repeated U.S. position that “a peaceful resolu- tion of the cross-strait issue is a matter for both sides to decide so long as it is made without coercion” remains valid. Pres. Bush recently told a questioner: “I am con- vinced the cross-strait issue can be solved peacefully. It is just going to take some time to do. And we will continue to work to see to it that it [is resolved].” Toward that end, there should not be any illusions or false expectations on our part. Over the next five years, the U.S. must remain vigilant while encourag- ing the two rivals to build trust. Although there is growing pressure within some circles for a higher level of U.S. engagement in cross-strait relations, there is no urgent need to do so or to micromanage the relationship. Our longstanding policy, based on caution, firmness and balance, as articulated and endorsed by seven administrations, is working, albeit not perfectly. The longer all three governments avoid taking precipitous action that could disrupt the status quo, the brighter the prospects of long-term peace and stability throughout the region. ■ F O C U S M A Y 2 0 0 5 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 63