The Foreign Service Journal, May 2005

“Instead, the widespread perception was that oil only fueled the success of a small privileged sector of society directly associated with the enterprise or its affiliates.” Former President Jimmy Carter warned in a speech this past January that Latin America’s impoverished millions could turn to “radical and destructive” behavior unless gov- ernments do a better job of meeting their needs. He said more than 225 million people in Latin America and the Caribbean are consigned to extreme poverty. And in 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell said that if democracy does not deliver a better life for Latin Americans, then “it is possible for us to go back- ward” — meaning a retreat to authoritarian rule. Chavez himself said former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, as he was leaving office, expressed frustration over Brazil’s widespread desti- tution. Cardoso said, accord- ing to Chavez, “‘I governed Brazil, one of the biggest nations in the world, for eight years, and in all those eight years, Brazil’s economy didn’t stop growing.’ Then he said an amazing thing: ‘Neither did poverty stop growing.’” In Venezuela, simmering resentment turned into rebel- lion in February 1989. When President Carlos Andres Perez imposed austerity measures to deal with a declining economy, the response was mass protests that shook his gov- ernment. Venezuelans were losing their faith in traditional political parties, a point underscored when the Chavez-led coup attempt in 1992 nearly succeeded. People were tired of corruption, human rights violations, exclusionary politics and electoral fraud. Consider a World Bank assessment of where Venezuela stood in the late 1990s, at roughly the time when Chavez would take office: “(T)he percentage of Venezuelans living in poverty (household income of less than $2 a day) has increased from 32.2 percent in 1991 to 48.5 percent in 2000. Likewise, the proportion of those living in extreme poverty, below $1 a day, rose from 11.8 percent to 23.5 percent. This increased poverty is accompanied by a widening inequality gap. Currently, the richest 20 percent of Venezuelans receives 53 percent of all income, while the poorest 20 percent accounts for only a 3-percent share...” A leading Venezuelan intellectual and social crit- ic, the late Arturo Uslar Pietri, once lamented how little ordinary people benefited from what he described as the “15 Marshall Plans” worth of oil revenue the country had received over the years. Chavez Consolidates Power Against that backdrop, Chavez won the 1998 presidential elections by a wide margin. He took office in February 1999, a 44-year old black-Indian nationalist who promised clean government and a better deal for the poor. Privately, Chavez assured U.S. diplomats that he was a committed democrat, but the Clinton administration remained wary of this dynamic new figure. While alienating the middle and upper classes with con- frontational policies, Chavez has tackled poverty with a vengeance. He mobilized the armed forces in programs to help the poor, initiated literacy campaigns and provided free education for school dropouts. The government has delivered low-cost food and medical ser- vices to poor areas. It has established a new university for the poor. Cuba has provided a huge assist, dispatching up- wards of 10,000 health experts, teachers and sports trainers to underserved areas of Vene- zuela. All of this has brought enormous political benefits for Chavez. Last August, an opposition attempt to oust him through a recall referendum ended with a lopsided victory for the president. But at the same time, the country has strayed far afield from traditional democratic norms. The Venezuelan Congress, dominated by Chavez loyalists, has approved leg- islation enabling the government to shut down private media outlets for vaguely defined offenses. The president has authorized the seizure of privately owned farms, part of what he calls “the war against the estates.” He arranged for an enlargement of the Supreme Court from 20 to 32, per- mitting him to appoint new justices known for loyalty to him. Indeed, the court has named an electoral council that is top-heavy with Chavez supporters. This should bode well for Chavez’s expected re-election run in 2006. The once powerful opposition to Chavez has turned qui- escent, seemingly cowed by legal action planned against some of its leaders. Among them is Maria Corina Machado, of a civic group known as Sumate, which helped organize last year’s referendum to unseat Chavez. She and some allies could face treason charges for having received $31,000 in U.S. funding for Sumate through a private prodemocracy endowment. Machado says the money was used for nonpar- tisan voter education projects. The government accuses her of seeking “to destroy the republican nature of the country.” Robert Zoellick, the new deputy secretary of State, testi- fied at his Senate confirmation hearing in February that M A Y 2 0 0 5 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 65 Bush administration officials are well aware of the many parallels between Chavez’s and Castro’s respective rises to power.