The Foreign Service Journal, May 2005

There are reports that this weapon has already been used in assassina- tions overseas, and that at least 25 were bought by Osama bin Laden. California has now banned possession of this weapon, citing the danger of its falling into the hands of terrorists. Hopefully, other states and the feder- al government will quickly follow California’s suit. In order to control DU munitions worldwide, we could design and bring into force an international pro- tocol, or convention, as was done to combat the fluorocarbon threat to the global environment. Progress toward such a convention must entail several phases, not necessarily sequential. And we can begin development of our own governmental regulatory framework to take control of DU stockpiles, to limit DU armament manufacture, and ensure our own responsible use of DU munitions. Although much strong evidence already exists in the technical litera- ture, a rigorous and extensive risk assessment should be made of DU as an environmental contaminant in air, soil and water. The assessment must recognize and attempt to answer the questions that will be raised by devil’s advocates or by just plain unbelievers: • Although most organic pollu- tants break down over time, metals naturally persist in a system. True, but can’t bioaccumulation play an important part in hazard assess- ment? After all, many organisms have adaptive responses for elimi- nating or sequestering metals; in- deed, some metals are essential nutri- ents at low levels. • Can the oxidative state of a metal, which can change depending on environmental conditions, deter- mine its toxicity? • Can the solubility of a metal also affect its toxicity? National authorities characteristi- cally take decades to conclude that there is a clear cause-and-effect rela- tionship between disease and human exposure to a particular chemical — to realize that coal should not be burned without pollution controls and lead should not be added to gasoline. But there is an urgency to this issue that demands we begin to respond to the threat now. In essence, DU munitions should be treated like other chemical weapons of mass destruction, but DU’s toxic properties remain as hazards for a much longer time and can be passed on to future generations. For- tunately, there seems to be a grow- ing public perception that DU is indeed toxic to humans, and that its use in munitions must be strictly controlled. Responsible Stewardship We expect the U.S. military to act quickly and decisively in devising solutions to threats to our national security. So we generally do not require it to do environmental impact studies, or publish its intentions in the Federal Register and call for com- ment, before employing more effi- cient, more destructive tactics, equip- ment and munitions. And as described above, replacing lead armor with depleted uranium already affords our troops additional protection and has saved lives. Nonetheless, a short-term com- bat initiative, even if successful in a specific context, may turn out to have longer-lasting and unintended, 72 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A Y 2 0 0 5 Incredibly, these weapons are already available commercially.