The Foreign Service Journal, May 2006

M A Y 2 0 0 6 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 5 The persistent calls to militarize the Foreign Service have grown more frequent and shrill since Secretary Rice outlined her vision of “transformational diplomacy” in January. For the FS to be relevant to the conduct of post-9/11 American foreign policy, we are told, it must stand side-by-side with our mili- tary in combat zones and immediate post-conflict situations and be trans- formed into practitioners of “extreme diplomacy.” The litmus test for its rele- vance is apparently directed assign- ments to war zones. The existing construct of embassy security preparedness, based on the premise that our diplomatic staff must be protected and posts drawn down or closed according to sober assessments of pre-approved “trip wire” scenarios and related risk, is apparently consid- ered a relic of the pre-“long war” past. Failing such a radical overhaul, we are warned, the military will dominate American foreign policy. The critics appear less concerned by the implica- tions of this than by fear that themilitary can’t do everything by itself. The extent of the overhaul needed and the degree to which working seamlessly with our military should replace traditional diplo- matic work seems directly related to the degree one views pre-emptive war as being the central element of American foreign policy in the future. There is little doubt that the Foreign Service can be better posi- tioned to advance U.S. interests over- seas. Reaction in the FS has been overwhelmingly positive to transfor- mational diplomacy and the shifting of positions to key developing countries. However, there is also little doubt that the biggest threat to the success of the transformational diplomacy initiative is inadequate funding, and in this busi- ness funding levels are the only true indicator of our leaders’ real priorities. Virtually everyone agrees that the State Department has an important role to play in bringing “stability and recon- struction” to post-conflict situations where the U. S. has direct interests around the world. However, the paltry level of funding appropriated to date to develop the envisioned, already legis- lated FSO rapid reaction force speaks for itself. The cold, hard reality is that the United States is conducting its foreign policy within the constraints of a static to slightly expanding budget. Another reality is that after deployment, a sta- bilization and reconstruction corps will need sizable programs to have any impact beyond symbolism. To trans- form, these FSOs must have the means to engage the target popula- tion, means that do not presently exist. The prospects for meaningful levels of such funding are negligible. Even with streamlined USAID funding cat- egories, the fact is that we have mini- mal or no AID presence at all in a number of key TD countries (e.g., China). So if the Secretary’s point of departure for transformational diplo- macy is more “hands-on” activism and program management and less obser- vation and reporting, then the key ingredient to success isn’t even on the table yet. But even with all the FSOs and funding one could dream of, the sine qua non for transformational success is peace and stability. If FSOs cannot do their jobs for fear of their lives, if the physical infrastructure and institutional basis of transformed states cannot be built before being destroyed again, the notion that directed assignments to war zones is the litmus test for FS relevance is a fat canard. If the FS is to be militarized in the context of static budgets, what price is the United States willing to pay? What is presently being done that should be dropped because already inadequate resources are shifted elsewhere? The distinguishing feature of the Foreign Service is its unparalleled foreign area expertise. Its vast knowledge of the pol- itics, economies, and cultures of remote parts of the globe make the State Department indispensable in prevent- ing war and winning peace — if it is heeded. Reducing this strength and shifting the focus of American diploma- cy from preventing war to picking up the pieces afterward would be utterly profound. Is that what transformation- al diplomacy is all about? That’s not the way I’ve read the Secretary’s intent on TD. Those who advocate militarizing the FS should not confuse U.S. long- term national interests with their per- sonal political agendas, and should avoid throwing the baby out with the bathwater. n P RESIDENT ’ S V IEWS Ensuring the Foreign Service’s Relevance: The Baby or the Bathwater B Y J. A NTHONY H OLMES J. Anthony Holmes is the president of the American Foreign Service Association.