The Foreign Service Journal, May 2006

M A Y 2 0 0 6 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 59 All Foreign Policy Is Local Defense Relations Between The United States and Vietnam: The Process of Normalization, 1977-2003 Lewis M. Stern, McFarland & Company, Inc, 2005, paperback, $49.95, 291 pages. R EVIEWED BY D AVID R EUTHER From time to time a book comes along that illustrates a truth familiar to the professional diplomat: domes- tic parameters within interacting countries often explain the goals and conduct of foreign policy. A classic in this genre, Lewis Stern’s Defense Relations Between the United States and Vietnam: The Process of Normal- ization, 1977-2003 should be re- quired reading for every advanced class in international relations. Beyond a meticulous review of the policy process in both countries, Stern’s analysis highlights the private and public actors who are part of the process, including American legisla- tors who block initiatives and Vietnamese generals and bureau- crats who are disparaging, fearful and unimaginative. Among the great strengths of this book are the author’s unparalleled research in Vietnamese-language materials and his extraordinary access to Vietnamese officials. As the Southeast Asia team chief in the office of the Secretary of Defense during the period the book covers, Stern cultivated ties to Vietnamese bureaucrats visiting Washington and during his own trips to Hanoi, affording him an incredible window into the thinking of both bureaucra- cies. After a preliminary chapter intro- ducing the major players, Stern begins the story with the Clinton administration, which had to maneu- ver around domestic speed bumps on the road to normal diplomatic rela- tions. Various laws, such as Jackson- Vanik (which requires unfettered emigration), had to be satisfied, giv- ing domestic groups multiple levers with which to thwart policy initia- tives. The problem-solving tool the administration used to communicate to American constituencies that it was proceeding slowly and cautious- ly was a series of presidential delega- tions to Hanoi. Unfortunately, Viet- namese ignorance of the role and influence of U.S. domestic groups in foreign-policy formulation led to growing impatience and suspicion — an attitude American actors would reciprocate from time to time. Despite the obstacles, Washing- ton opened a liaison office in Hanoi in February 1994, and the two nations established full diplomatic relations in July 1995. But it would take considerably longer for bilateral ties to include a military component. There were many reasons for this, but a key one was DOD’s concern that a domestic constituency would see assigning a defense attaché to Hanoi as interfering with the work of the pre-existing military offices focused solely on the issue of resolv- ing the cases of U.S. soldiers still missing in action after the Vietnam War. For their part, the Vietnamese were concerned the U.S. was trying to implicate them in an anti-Chinese alliance. But in the end, a consensus grew in Washington behind the belief that formal relations with Vietnam would assist the high prior- ity of MIA accounting and embed it in obligations of the international community in a way that assist broader U.S. interests. Dr. Stern repeatedly notes how domestic opposition on one side impacts the views and flexibility of the other. For example, Congress had long required DOD to report periodically on MIA cases about which it was judged possible that the Vietnamese could provide additional information. In the autumn of 1995 DOD reported, as it had before, that there was no evidence Hanoi was withholding information. This was not a result acceptable to congres- sional movers and shakers. That B OOKS This book reminds us that ignoring the internal politics of other countries is not conducive to sculpting successful foreign policy. u