The Foreign Service Journal, May 2007

A Difficult Decision While Ross is speaking primarily about the U.K.’s Foreign and Com- monwealth Office, there is an argu- ment to be made that the foreign pol- icy formulation process in Wash- ington already partially sidelines the professional diplomatic corps. As the late, great George F. Kennan com- mented a decade ago in Foreign Affairs, “[T]he State Department has been largely deprived of its tradition- al role as … the coordinator of for- eign policy. … [H]undreds of other areas of international relations have been abandoned to the desires and whims of the numerous forces on the Washington scene [including] various congressional committees, with their huge staffs, and the swarms of special interests that fasten on the latter like bees on a flower.” Kennan also noted that only 30 percent of the U.S. gov- ernment employees working in mis- sions overseas were Department of State personnel; the majority work for other agencies. Ross says that the foreign policy formulation process in the U.S. is more “transparent and eclectic” than in the U.K. For example, he deems congressional scrutiny of America’s foreign policy superior to the “weak efforts” of Britain’s parliament. How- ever, Ross contends that “Even in the U.S., foreign policy is regarded as an elite practice, displaying particular ‘statist’ and thus narrow ways of thinking about the world.” He says the interagency process “encourages an obsession with consensus,” which often fails to give “proper considera- tion of the complex reality abroad.” When asked about the interagency process in the months leading to the 2003 invasion of Iraq — during which State lost more than a few turf wars — Ross notes that “the State Depart- ment was clearly excluded from the thrust of decision-making in the run up to the war. It does not follow, however, that decisions would have been better. In the State Depart- ment, as in Britain’s foreign ministry, there was a tendency to believe and plan on the basis of the most opti- mistic post-invasion scenarios.” Ross’s anguish regarding his resig- nation was evident in our interview. He spent two years agonizing over the decision: “My attachment to my identity as a diplomat was so great that I could not tear myself away, despite my disgust at the behavior of my government. I drafted numerous resignation letters but did not send them. My anguish deepened after the invasion of Iraq, but I continued to waver between resignation and the self-interest of my career. To put off the choice, I went to Kosovo on sec- ondment to the U.N. mission there.” “Then, in the summer of 2004, I testified to the Butler inquiry. The act of testifying was an epiphany of sorts for me: setting down my views (i.e., that the case for war was exag- gerated and that there were viable alternatives to war) hardened my resolve. Shortly after giving my testi- mony to Butler, I sent it to the Foreign Secretary as my resignation from the British diplomatic service.” The Last Resort Ross’ advice for career diplomats with serious concerns about policies they defend and implement is simple. “Tell it like you see it. The Foreign Service, whether in the U.S. or U.K., needs open debate inside as well as out. Both should encourage a culture of questioning and debate: better pol- icy will result.” Ross notes that the U.S. Army has encouraged and even appointed skeptics whose role it is to question the conventional institutional wis- dom: “an official devil’s advocate,” as Ross puts it. He adds, “I did not do 44 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A Y 2 0 0 7 For more information: Ross’ submission to the Butler Review, June 2004: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/ cmselect/cmfaff/167/6110810.htm New York Times profile of Ross, March 3, 2007: www.nytimes.com/2007/03/03/world/europe/03ross.html Independent Diplomat: Dispatches from an Unaccountable Elite , Carne Ross (Cornell University Press, April 2007): www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/cup_detail.taf?ti_id=4707 “Secrets, Lies and Diplomats,” Carne Ross, The New Statesman , Feb. 26, 2007 (excerpt from his book): www.newstatesman.com/200702260026 “Diplomacy Without Diplomats?,” George F. Kennan, Foreign Affairs , September/ October 1997: www.foreignaffairs.org/19970901faessay3805-p0/george-f-kennan/ diplomacy-without-diplomats.html — Ludovic Hood Carne Ross “The abiding feature of foreign policymaking is its closed, secretive and circumscribed nature.” — Carne Ross