The Foreign Service Journal, May 2008

14 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A Y 2 0 0 8 T he details of a tense Jan. 6 inci- dent involving U.S. warships and Iranian naval vessels in the Strait of Hormuz remain murky. But even the most benign interpretation makes clear the urgent need for mea- sures to prevent a recurrence. Initial press reports based on brief- ings by U.S. military officials, includ- ing Vice Admiral Kevin Cosgriff, com- mander of the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command that operates in the Middle East, described a situation in which five Iranian patrol boats manned by the Revolutionary Guard Corps sped toward several U.S. Navy ships as they crossed the Strait of Hormuz into the Persian Gulf. The Iranian vessels reportedly broke into two groups, “maneuvered aggressive- ly” along the sides of the American ships, and dropped white “box-like” objects into the water. According to the officials, as the U.S. ships pre- pared to fire in self-defense the Iranians turned and sped back to their territorial waters. The Pentagon released a four- minute video showing the Iranian boats speeding toward the U.S. ships. Audio (presumably from the boats) accompanying the video contained an apparent threat to bomb the U.S. ships. Striking a somewhat cautious tone, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said that, based on the information available to him, this was a one-sided provocation, an assessment President George W. Bush quickly seconded. The Iranian government, on the other hand, played down the event, describing it as a routine exchange in which the U.S. ships complied with a request from an officer on one of the Iranian boats that the American ves- sels identify themselves. The Iranians released their own video of the inci- dent, which did not portray aggressive behavior on their part. DOD did not directly challenge the veracity of the Iranian account; in fact, it acknowledged that the threat- ening message it had cited (included with the video it had released) may not have come from the Iranian boats and may not have been addressed to U.S. targets. Subsequent reports sug- gest that there is little, if any, evidence that the actions of the Iranian boats were intentionally provocative or actually violated international law. Some observers believe Washing- ton may have hyped the incident ini- tially as part of a campaign to demo- nize Tehran. Whatever the truth of that claim, events of this kind go back to 1987 when the U.S. was protecting Kuwaiti oil tankers in the Persian Gulf toward the end of the Iran-Iraq War. Several clashes with U.S. forces resulted in the maiming and death of Iranian small-boat personnel. And in 1988, the USS Vincennes shot down an Iranian civilian airliner in the Strait of Hormuz, killing all 290 people on board. Dangerous Encounters, Safer Outcomes That history underscores the urgent need for a “rules of the road” under- standing between Washington and Tehran. The situation in the Persian Gulf is even more perilous, and the lack of adequate channels of direct communication more severe, than was the case between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The American naval buildup in the region and U.S.-Iranian differences over Iraq, Hamas and the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, and Lebanon and Hezbollah, all as well as Iran’s nuclear program, all make for an environment that is highly charged, fragile and very susceptible to destructive develop- ments. Disturbingly, U.S. commanders in the region have no way to communi- cate directly with the Iranian Navy or Revolutionary Guard. DOD officials have said they want to prevent future naval interactions in the region from escalating into confrontation based on misunderstandings. Toward that end, Retired Admiral James Lyons, who has served as commander of the Paci- Heading Off More Clashes in the Strait of Hormuz B Y B ENJAMIN T UA S PEAKING O UT Talking with, rather than at, Tehran is certain to be more fruitful than pursuing retaliatory military strikes.