The Foreign Service Journal, May 2008

heads prevailed. Washington opted for a U.N. peace enforcement intervention that turned out to be successful in stabilizing the Congo and restoring central government control. This served as a major precedent for future cases of state collapse in Africa. To the chagrin and outrage of left-wing political move- ments worldwide, Patrice Lumumba was assassinated by Congolese political rivals a few months after indepen- dence. For decades afterward, the CIA was accused of having orchestrated Lumumba’s demise in a Cold War- driven covert action. The truth was revealed in 2006 when Larry Devlin, the CIA station chief in the Congo in 1960, published his memoir, Chief of Station, Congo: Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone . Devlin acknowl- edged that he had received instructions to assassinate Lumumba using poisoned toothpaste, but decided to do nothing. Still, although the CIA had no actual connection with the dirty deed, those who did it knew that the U.S. would not be upset. Going Their Own Way While the U.S. and other donors were busy contribut- ing to African development, the newly anointed African leaders were formulating their own political and eco- nomic policies. Rejecting Western multiparty democra- cy because of its supposedly adversarial nature, the early leaders opted for “one-party democracy” in keeping with the African village tradition of consensus-building. Under this system, the original anti-colonial nationalist movement became the sole legal party, and opposition political parties were prohibited by law. All civil society inherited from the colonial period, as well as all media and cultural institutions, were also co-opted into the rul- ing party. On the economic front, African leaders followed the advice of their European socialist mentors in France and the U.K. to take control of the commanding heights of the economy in order to kick-start and accelerate develop- ment. As a result, thousands of enterprises, including banks, insurance companies, construction firms, planta- tions, transportation and mines were legally nationalized with appropriate compensation. It was not immediately evident to the U.S. and the donor community in the early 1960s, an era when big gov- ernment was still popular in both Europe and America, but these initial African decisions turned out to be disas- trous — both for economic development and political evolution. For the most part, one-party democracies that faced no checks, balances or countervailing power degen- erated into corrupt, rent-seeking, authoritarian systems. The management of thousands of state-owned enter- prises became a daunting challenge. Unfortunately, a very low priority was assigned to profitability. Payrolls were padded to create employment for rural Africans flocking to the cities to escape deep poverty. Government subsi- dies were needed to keep the enterprises afloat, thereby draining capital away from required investments in edu- cation, public health and infrastructure maintenance, all of which deteriorated. To make up for lost revenue, gov- ernments took out commercial loans fromWestern banks, secured by future commodity earnings or as simple sover- eign debt. By the early 1970s, a decade after the peak of the inde- pendence avalanche, the U.S. had become somewhat dis- illusioned about Africa’s prospects. In particular, Congress was beginning to ask tough questions. What was there to show for all that assistance? Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C., dismissed foreign aid as “throwing one’s money down a rat hole.” The Nixon and Ford administrations decided to revamp aid to Africa, instituting a “new directions” policy that shifted the focus from channeling resources through governments to delivering services directly to the rural poor. Maternal-child health centers, small water projects, farm-to-market roads and livestock management pro- grams proliferated. Making matters worse, between 1975 and 1980 the bottom dropped out of international commodity markets. The price of copper on the London Metals Exchange went from $1.40/lb to $0.75 almost overnight. Zambia and Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) suddenly found their debt burden doubled, with their earnings cut in half. Throughout the continent, economies were in free fall. Government salaries were months in arrears, small businesses went under and mal- nutrition deepened. It was clear by 1980 that Africa needed some tough love and some bitter medicine. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund offered soft loans for debt restructuring, and bridge financing for vital government functions. In return, African governments had to institute macroeconomic reforms designed to prime the revenue pump, make exports competitive, discourage unnecessary imports and curb inflation. F O C U S M A Y 2 0 0 8 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 19