The Foreign Service Journal, May 2008

This policy, called “structural adjust- ment,” became controversial because so many belts had to be tightened, and the heavy hand of government had to be loosened. But it was clear by 1990 that countries like Ghana, Mali, Botswana, Uganda and Mozambique that had implemented systematic eco- nomic and political reforms had turned their economies around. Instead of shrinking by as much as 6 percent a year, the gross domestic product of these countries began enjoying annual growth of 2 to 4 percent, setting the stage for an even greater effort at poverty reduction. Untying the Gordian Knot While the World Bank and IMF were acting as eco- nomic “bad cops,” the Carter and Reagan administrations focused their attention on resolving several longstanding, interlocked African crises. In southern Africa, repressive white minority regimes in the British colony of Southern Rhodesia and the inde- pendent Republic of South Africa were coming under increasing pressure from free Africa, and civil society movements throughout the world, to allow majority rule. By 1975, both regimes were facing growing armed insur- gencies by black nationalist movements. The Carter administration worked closely with London to pressure the Rhodesian regime to negotiate with the nationalist movements, leading to the Lancaster House Agreements and the emergence of the indepen- dent Republic of Zimbabwe in 1980. South Africa was a tougher nut to crack because of the extreme racist ideology, known by the Afrikaner term apartheid (separation), that governed the wealthy and powerful two-million-strong white minority. Ending this system, and bringing freedom to 30 million South Africans of color, was the highest and very emotional pri- ority for all independent African nations. The Carter administration began its campaign to undermine apartheid by noting that Pretoria was in vio- lation of United Nations and World Court directives to transition Southwest Africa (now Namibia) to indepen- dence, instead expressing determination to annex the ter- ritory. Washington drew the noose tighter by persuading the U.N. Security Council to pass a resolution demand- ing that the colony be freed. By the time Ronald Reagan took of- fice in 1981, racist minority rule in South Africa had become a significant political issue in the United States. Growing repression and violence against black South African street demonstrations pro- voked Sunday sermons and campus demonstrations throughout the U.S. In 1986, Congress enacted economic sanc- tions in a stunning override of Pres. Reagan’s veto, reflecting the depth of feeling in the nation. Meanwhile, American conservatives had become agi- tated by the presence in Angola of 25,000 Cuban troops and several thousand Soviet advisers, who were propping up a Marxist regime against anticommunist guerillas. Reagan persuaded Congress to authorize covert action to give military support to the guerrilla forces (known as UNITA), led by Jonas Savimbi. At the same time, the State Department engaged with all of the parties as it mediated a “no lose” grand bargain to bring about peace in southern Africa. An intensive 24-month marathon negotiation begin- ning in January 1987 brought South Africa, Angola and Cuba to the same table under the chairmanship of Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Chester A. Crocker, a Republican political appointee. (Secretary of State George Shultz went out on a limb by authorizing American diplomats to deal directly with their Cuban counterparts in a special exception to the U.S. total boy- cott of the Castro regime.) The result was the December 1988 New York Accords that resulted in the indepen- dence of Namibia, the departure of Cuban troops from Angola, and the withdrawal of South African forces from southern Angola. This agreement was a triumph of U.S. diplomacy in its own right. But an added benefit was the beginning of the end of apartheid in South Africa itself. Highly motivated and reassured by the fairness of the 1988 accords, a younger generation of white politicians came to power in South Africa in 1990, overseeing an end of apartheid and the start of majority rule four years later. The difficult and complex political transition in South Africa took place during the George H.W. Bush administration, which applied a steady dose of quiet mediation among the negotiating parties working through the U.S. embassy in Pretoria. F O C U S 20 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A Y 2 0 0 8 It was clear by 1980 that the continent needed some tough love and some bitter medicine.