The Foreign Service Journal, May 2008

The command is led by General William E. Ward, whose deputies are Ambassador Mary Carlin Yates (an FSO) and Admiral Robert T. Moeller. The FY 2008 transition-year budget is $75 million; $392 million has been requested for FY 2009. The rationale for the new command is that it will improve the U.S. military focus on the continent and enhance American interagency support for the develop- ment of African military establishments. AFRICOM’s mission is to build local capacity so that African states can manage their own security issues. It is also intended to stimulate professionalization, enhance civilian control and inculcate respect for human rights. While many African governments embrace the idea of more attention to their military needs, they are concerned about possible great-power militarization of the continent. And they are apprehensive about the perception (as much as the reality) of undermining continental neutrality enshrined in the charter of the African Union (formerly the Organization of African Unity). Others are generally doubtful about of America’s intentions. Even though the Bush administration has articulated a credible explanation for the evolution to the new com- mand, many observers — at home and abroad — remain skeptical. Details are scarce about how AFRICOM’s civil and economic objectives will be pursued. President John Kufor of Ghana, for example, seized the occasion of Presi- dent George W. Bush’s recent stop to ask point-blank about U.S. intentions. Clearly, concerns arising from our military posture in Iraq and Afghanistan have provided fodder to critics. They variously decry the initiative as rep- resenting the extension of a global war on Islam, a prepara- tion to annex African oil fields, and U.S. military interfer- ence in politics, including the threat of regime change for nations that run afoul of Washington’s capricious whims. Such conclusions are balderdash, to be blunt, but they do contain kernels of truth. American policy does combat terrorism and much of the global variety does have Islamic connections. We want the world’s oil supplies to be secure and we do criticize autocratic regimes, especially those like Robert Mugabe’s in Zimbabwe that egregiously abuse the rights of their people. Reaching Out to African Militaries Shibboleths aside, it is worth examining the premise that African military establishments merit American sup- port at all. Even though national defense is regularly cited as their primary task, African armies rarely need to repel foreign invaders. Most African conflicts — e.g., Sudan, Chad, the Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Burundi, Liberia and Sierra Leone — arise from domes- tic issues. Only the unresolved Ethiopia-Eritrea border war, the recent Congolese wars and the Ethiopian pres- ence in Somalia fit the mode of external aggression. So instead of defense, the primary job of African armies is to protect the ruling regime by keeping the life president in power (by informal count some 15 current leaders initially came to power via military means) and to thwart threats to the status quo mounted by the opposi- tion, democratic or otherwise. To this end, militaries or special units thereof become tribal fiefdoms loyal to the president and dedicated to his well-being. Yet history shows that this sort of Praetorian Guard has had mixed results in protecting the incumbent. Many, if not most, coups were organized by those closest to the president. The list of chiefs of staff who staged them is lengthy: Amin, Bokassa, Kolingba, Deby, Buyoya, Baga- za, Habyarimana, Barre, Mobutu, Ironsi, Obasanjo, Ba- bangida, Eyadema, Kountche, Bashir and more. Perhaps recognizing this fact of political life, many presidents — including military men — have been only reluctant supporters of the national army. This hesitancy, reinforced by the impecunity of most states and the fact of underdevelopment, has kept African military establish- ments in the last rank. Even so, there is great diversity across the continent. Some are a mere hodgepodge of ill- equipped, untrained thugs who are more of a threat to society than an asset (e.g., the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad, Sudan). Others are a repository of political support for a regime, either because of ethnic affiliation or because of largess handed out to military leaders (Nigeria, Gabon). In some countries, army personnel are political- ly astute revolutionary fighters who learned their craft prior to becoming part of the ruling apparatus (Rwanda, F O C U S 26 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A Y 2 0 0 8 Retired Ambassador Robert Gribbin spent many years in Africa posted to the Central African Republic, Rwanda, Kenya and Uganda. He also served on delegations to the United Nations General Assembly and the U.N. Human Rights Commission. Since retiring from the Foreign Ser- vice, he has undertaken When Actually Employed assign- ments to Liberia, DRC, Djibouti, Ghana, Chad, Burundi, Mauritius and Nigeria. He is the author of In the After- math of Genocide: The U.S. Role in Rwanda (2005).