The Foreign Service Journal, May 2008

ranges from zero assistance for the abusive, nondemocratic regimes, through various types of individual or unit training for the less egregious ones, to communications gear, elec- tronic equipment, transportation assets and a full range of support for peacekeeping units run by more respectable nations. Such aid is pred- icated on a political assessment that it supports rather than contradicts broader U.S. policy in support of democracy, development and respect for human rights. The nexus of two competing objectives is where the hard calls arise. For example, an African nation’s commit- ment to counterterrorism might entice U.S. policymakers to seek closer ties to further such activism. However, recognition that the forces in question are blatant abusers of the rights of a struggling democratic opposition ought to dampen the prospects for American support. Which side do we want to be on in such cases? The current crises in Chad and Kenya pose policy ques- tions that might be answered differently in a robust AFRI- COM era. We have not meddled in Chad (leave it to the French!), but would we do so if we were focusing greater attention on its army? And in Kenya, except for one brief foray into Naivasha, the army has thus far stayed in the bar- racks — in part because it, too, is riven by tribal divisions, so any deployment might well result in internecine vio- lence. While we can applaud this restraint, it raises the question: What use is a national military in such a crisis? And what is the value of our investment in training it? Both situations certainly fall under the rubric of main- taining continental security, one of AFRICOM’s stated objectives. Yet it is hard to see how any direct U.S. involvement, via our military or theirs, could be produc- tive in resolving these crises. Although U.S. policy es- chews direct military involvement in such situations, American attacks against purported terrorist elements in Somalia, for example, suggest a likelihood that we would use those assets if we had them available. It is important to keep in mind that DOD and State intend AFRICOM to be different from other combatant commands (e.g., EUCOM, CENTCOM and PACOM). It has still-undefined responsibilities and tasks beyond the purely military sphere. For example, staffing plans call for an FSO as lead deputy (Amb. Yates is already in place) and up to a hundred or more intera- gency personnel. If nothing else, this demonstrates a clear intent to develop programs that focus on humanitarian and development issues. Some American advocates of pay- ing more attention to Africa, particu- larly in the NGO community, dismiss AFRICOM as a ruse to do that with- out really providing more resources. But it is a near-certainty that once the command is in place, more resources will flow to it. Pentagon cynics would add that one more four-star billet and all the accompanying support translates into more opportunities for advancement. Do Something Dramatic! U.S. spokesmen have said that the new command will be oriented toward humanitarian issues and military improvements. It will respond to catastrophes, help build competent national militaries, sustain nascent regional organizations, support economic development and politi- cal democracy. What appears to be missing in all the hoopla is an unequivocal response to Africa’s pressing security needs: the elimination of warlords, reduction of ethnic strife, achievement of internal peace and creation of a safer regional neighborhood. More tangible support for the continent’s armed forces, including training and some equipment, is indeed desirable, both for its own sake and to facilitate effective participation in African peacekeeping operations — to wit: Sudan, Somalia, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. But while this is a laudable objective, the U.S. contribution has a long lead time, leaving dangerous situations to fester. Why not move faster? Three opportunities come to mind. Fortunately, the first is already under way: using the U.S. Navy to combat piracy in the Red Sea and off the Horn of Africa. A broad- er effort to patrol the sea lanes off West Africa in order to halt illegal oil bunkering would be similarly aimed at restoring the rule of law. Clearly, this would entail enlist- ing the support of littoral states. The most dramatic initiative would be the provision of U.S. helicopters to UNAMIS, the United Nations peace- keeping operation in Sudan. The U.N. is seeking a squadron of several dozen choppers, most for lift, as well F O C U S 28 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A Y 2 0 0 8 AFRICOM’s mission is to build local capacity so that African states can manage their own security issues.