The Foreign Service Journal, May 2008

as several gunships. Efforts to find helicopters have so far come up empty, posing the risk that the whole operation will be scuttled. Offering up such support would indeed reinforce our intent to help Africa. But howls and arguments against the idea would be loud: we cannot bleed Iraq for Sudan; the U.S. should never participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations; Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir would never accept American forces. Undoubtedly, these are legitimate issues, but if AFRICOM wants to respond to security needs in Africa, no better task awaits. The mere willingness to fight the policy battle within the U.S. gov- ernment, and with the U.N. and Sudan, to implement such assistance would show solid commitment to Africa and underscore the legitimacy of the new command. Ambassadorial Responsibility From the State Department perspective, we need not fear AFRICOM’s advent. Not only does it have positive elements that should advance U.S. interests in various African nations, but seconding FSOs to the command will help ensure that DOD has broader thematic perspectives. However, AFRICOM does pose some issues that, if not sorted out early, might become irksome. Existing chief-of-mission authority is adequate for AFRICOM, so long as serving and future ambassadors exercise their responsibilities pursuant to the presidential letter of authority and under National Security Decision Directive 38, and the military components follow their own chain of command. In short, the ambassador has absolute authority over personnel and operations in his or her country of assignment. We should think about and treat non-resident AFRICOMpersonnel exactly as we did previous command elements. All visitors, military and civilian, will still require coun- try clearances. All programs, whether involving exercises (JCET), training (IMET and ACOTA), sales (FMS) or counterterrorism (TSCTP), are subject to ambassadorial approval. The only exception is the forces of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, some 1,500 troops stationed at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti, who cur- rently fall under the operational control of CENTCOM (but will eventually shift to AFRICOM). In accordance with existing practice, such combat elements enjoy a sep- arate chain of command, but their in-country, non-combat activities — drilling wells in Djibouti, for example — all remain subject to ambassadorial oversight. Because the new Africa Command does not anticipate stationing any additional combat personnel on the continent or setting up other bases, there should be no other exceptions to chief-of-mission authority. As an aside, let me note that Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance, the program that pro- vides training and equipment to African units scheduled for deployment as multilateral peacekeepers, will not — at least initially — become an AFRICOM responsibility. ACOTA (formerly known as the African Crisis Response Initiative) is America’s most successful and useful military program in Africa, one that has helped prepare contin- gents from Nigeria, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Ghana and other countries for service in Darfur, Somalia, Liberia and the Congo. ACOTA is funded via the peacekeeping account administered by the State Department, and State does not intend to relinquish control. Where to Set Up Shop? Various soundings around the continent have shown that the time is not ripe for the establishment of a large military headquarters in Africa. The issue is apparently too emotional and too tied up in the uncertainties of what AFRICOM is all about. Logistics issues also constrain a move. Whenever a relocation fromGermany is approved, facilities for it will have to be built from the ground up. Only Liberia, perhaps understanding the positive eco- nomic impact of such an installation, has stepped forward to seek emplacement of the headquarters on its soil. Even though the headquarters will remain in Germany for now, AFRICOM anticipates standing up three or four sub-headquarters around the continent to get at least some personnel into the theater of operations. About 30 per- sonnel on standard tours of duty would be assigned to each unit. Although locales have yet to be determined, logical- ly they would correspond to the geographic regions of Africa. Djibouti already takes care of East Africa, but sites will still be needed in the west (Ghana or Liberia are lead- ing candidates), the south (probably Botswana) and the north (Tunisia or Morocco) — although this idea has less traction. While the structure will be important for the countries concerned, what is most crucial from an intera- gency perspective will be the interaction between the regional headquarters elements and the host embassy. Note that such regional offices will be a new global ele- ment to be invented in Africa. The sub-commands of other combatant commands — Diego Garcia, Okinawa, F O C U S M A Y 2 0 0 8 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 29