The Foreign Service Journal, May 2008

Korea, etc. — include operational forces that are exempt- ed from chief-of-mission authority. On the whole, we should consider such offices similar to USAID’s Regional Economic Development Services Offices: i.e., they and their personnel fall under COM authority. Thus, when they operate in a particular coun- try, the U.S. ambassador there is in charge. And when they travel regionally, they come under the purview of the ambassador to each nation being visited. It is worth noting that both USAID and DOD already deal separately with African regional organizations, such as the Southern African Development Community or the Economic Community of West African States. But what if ECOWAS wants to conduct a military exercise in Togo with U.S. input, with the planning, logistical support, etc. coming from its headquarters in Abuja? Which ambas- sador has authority? The answer is both, but this will require coordination on the U.S. side. Such multilateral coordination will loom even larger and become more complex as AFRICOM expands its cooperation with the African Union. Practical Constraints According to Pentagon sources, each AFRICOM regional office should consist of about 30 personnel; some uniformed, some not. These staffers will need a lot of office space that is clearly not available inside any existing embassy. Thus, pending expansion of chancelleries or building annexes, facilities will have to be leased. These personnel and their families will also need substantial administrative support: housing, health care, shipping, transportation, contracting, cashiering and educational opportunities for dependents. Virtually all these services will place an immense burden on receiving embassies. Although many AFRICOM personnel might be assigned on a TDY basis initially, the required logistical support package is just as intimidating as for those on longer tours, except perhaps for housing. While all concerned will do their utmost to make this work, it won’t be easy. A key principle at stake is equity: keeping the playing field level so that no one gets more, better or different services at post than anyone else. The new influx of staff — particularly military personnel who are accustomed to a global standard of support — will challenge that approach, but adherence to that principle will be key to making AFRICOM offices and personnel part of the country team. An augmented in-country military presence also raises thorny operational issues like communications. Initially, AFRICOM offices can utilize existing embassy networks, but they will soon want their own separate systems. How can this be accommodated? Similarly, AFRICOM will want its own security force, which will affect the embassy’s regional security office. Who will do the hiring? How will State and DOD practices be melded? Will there be mil- itary police alongside Marine security guard detach- ments? And then there is the question of weapons, an operational issue related to force protection in the wake of terrorist threats. Which members of the country team can bear arms and under what circumstances? Then we come to responsibilities for reporting, intel- ligence collection and analysis. Most ambassadors have existing understandings with defense attachés as to which DAO messages need clearance by the political- economic section and the front office. But a larger mil- itary element at post will necessarily intrude upon such understandings. It will be incumbent upon the ambas- sador and the AFRICOM chief to work out these para- meters. To ensure consistency, written guidelines should be developed. Striking a Balance With the Africa Command’s advent, turf issues will intensify — and not just in the countries hosting those personnel. Already, U.S. military resources and projects are crossing ministerial lines across the continent. While the key local client for AFRICOM remains the ministry of defense, U.S. military resources already go toward pro- jects in various civilian ministries, including water devel- opment, women’s affairs, health, interior and aviation. Undertakings include a full gamut of activities ranging from humanitarian succor and HIV/AIDS prevention to democracy promotion and public diplomacy. Obviously, military programming risks duplication where USAID, the Centers for Disease Control, Peace Corps Volunteers and others are already engaged. That said, host governments are quick to realize where the money is, so they will increasingly address their requests to U.S. military elements. The proposed structure of AFRICOM responds to this reality. Although the number and type of interagency bil- lets has yet to be finalized, it is clear that the command will have a significant civilian element, including experts in economic development and complex humanitarian emer- F O C U S 30 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A Y 2 0 0 8