The Foreign Service Journal, May 2010

we had such a program in the past, my experience was that the Service failed to train such officers in the basic skills of the institution that most of us had acquired as junior of- ficers. As a result, we ended up with mid-level officers who could do some things brilliantly but, to the frustration of their DCMs and am- bassadors, couldn’t manage such mundane tasks as organizing a mo- torcade for a high-level visit or draft- ing a press release. Of course, these gaps could be alleviated with training. But the point is that because we didn’t train them, careers suffered, as well as nerves. It is but one of the many pitfalls of not taking in-service train- ing seriously. Another example stems from our current focus on test- ing for general characteristics without requiring any de- tailed knowledge of diplomatic history or practice for entry into the Foreign Service. The notion that bright folk will learn what they need to know on the job is debatable. What is far less debatable is that they will have a harder time if there are few experts to teach them and no struc- ture to help. Furthermore, because the limited physical capacity of the Foreign Service Institute has forced the reduction of entry-level orientation from seven weeks to five, we are sending greater numbers of less-prepared personnel into the field to be supervised by fewer experienced ones. Whether one looks at the breakdown of old ways of training, the need for new skills in a new century, or the fact that others, from the U.S. military to private business, invest billions in staff development while the Foreign Service devotes pennies, the need for enhanced profes- sional development stands out. That need raises three questions: What is to be taught? Who is to be trained? How are the resources to be obtained? What to Teach? Ask any Foreign Service generalist with a few years in the Service to describe what is needed in training, and the response is apt to be eloquent, long and frequently pas- sionate. By the time one gets to my generation, you can be pretty sure of at least the last two elements. The other thing one can count on is disagreements. One of the most current is how “ex- peditionary” the Service should be. That term has caused some defini- tional problems but, as it is being used by the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and the United States Institute for Peace, it means that civilians need to be available for rapid deployment with skills in program management, contracting, and working productively with USAID and other agencies. They also require training in how short-term relief and stabilization measures should relate to long-term economic and governance development. It is in this sense that former Ambassadors Ryan Crocker and Marc Grossman have called explicitly for more expe- ditionary training. Others have responded that there is more to the For- eign Service than deploying as junior partners to the mil- itary, and that we ought to get back to “traditional” diplomacy. Or as the Journal ’s editor wrote when re- questing this article, “Are we going to go on serving in- creasingly … as ‘expeditionary’ diplomats, or revert to more traditional roles as we phase down (eventually) in Iraq and Afghanistan?” There is now substantial evidence that the answer is “both.” Too much of the current debate treats the question of the expeditionary diplomat as though it were either an ex- citing new discovery or a temporary aberration. It is nei- ther. A recent FSJ article (Bob Rackmales, “Lucius Battle: Shaper of the Postwar Foreign Service,” July-August 2009) reminds us that in 1963, Special Assistant to the President Ralph Dungan spoke to AFSA of the “need to expand the traditional concept of foreign policy.” Dungan called for a “new emphasis on operations and manage- ment of programs.” Two great names from the postwar era subsequently addressed the issue. Loy Henderson offered a rebuttal, and Luke Battle responded in an address that recalled “the struggles of 1946, when … ‘a small elite corps’ had failed to recognize the need for change. By not training… not broadening …not bringing in economists … the For- eign Service was dominated by others … and that was the beginning of its decline.” Battle’s pessimistic analysis has been borne out. The Foreign Service has ceded a growing number of functions It is ridiculous that most FSOs have had no formal training in conducting negotiations, either with foreigners or within the interagency community. 20 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A Y 2 0 1 0 F O C U S