The Foreign Service Journal, May 2010

30 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A Y 2 0 1 0 and Budget, Congress and the [American] public for the resources we need.” Complicating matters is the fact that dozens of other federal agencies have an overseas presence. Only in the White House and in the individ- ual country teams are these diverse programs considered as a total pack- age. Even then, limitations on presidential attention make any oversight sporadic and incomplete, and the de facto authority of the chief of mission within U.S. em- bassies is too limited even to ensure tactical integration. As a result, programs ranging from crisis response to economic relations, development assistance, humanitarian relief, public broadcasting, migration, human rights, polit- ical-military engagement, arms control, educational ex- changes, science and technology, and many others are fractured and spread across many agencies and bureaus. To put it bluntly, the Department of State was not de- signed, nor is it equipped, to manage the nation’s in- creasingly diverse responsibilities in a globalized world. While State continues to occupy the center of the organi- zational chart, it does not exercise sufficient authority or possess sufficient resources to manage the full range of global affairs effectively. Nor does the Secretary of State have the kind of robust management and personnel struc- ture that would enable him or her to effectively provide strategic leadership, oversight and coordination over the conduct of foreign affairs. A Next-Generation State Department In theory, Sec. Clinton’s vision fits the currently popu- lar “whole of government” concept. In practice, however, State is incapable of managing both routine operations and responding to crises. I therefore propose consolidat- ing most international programs within a “Next-Genera- tion State Department,” which would be structured as a comprehensive, mission-oriented organization, have an effective executive management structure and process, and develop a new institutional culture based on a single system-wide personnel system combined with a compre- hensive, professional educational system. The rationale for this proposal is twofold. First, the federal government has little capacity for making trade- offs at the strategic or regional levels; secondly, programs promoting soft power lack integration and coordination. A thorough assessment of this prob- lem of the absence of effective cross- department executive authority was conducted in 2007-2008 by the Proj- ect on National Security Reform, a congressionally mandated effort that involved a broad coalition of organi- zations and individuals. The PNSR concluded that effec- tive integration requires us to “elevate and integrate the unique dimensions of development, diplomacy and pub- lic diplomacy into a unified whole.” The organizational objective of this unified whole would be to empower the Secretary of State to coordinate the entire international relations mechanism abroad, putting him or her in a bet- ter position to implement presidential policy. Bundling together related authorities and resources would also im- prove implementation of related programs. There are numerous precedents for this approach. The Department of Defense is the oldest and most suc- cessful model, while the Department of Homeland Se- curity and the Office of the Director of National Intelli- gence are more recent creations (both still works in pro- gress). As with the concept of “jointness” that revolution- ized American defense capabilities through the Goldwa- ter-Nichols Act of 1986, the reinvented Department of State would draw upon a combination of directive author- ity and procedural, human capital and cultural changes. Creating a “Next-Generation” Department of State with this new character would not in itself lead to an in- crease in the overall budget for foreign relations activities. It would, however, provide the means to use resources more effectively and efficiently. Finally, this move would help correct the imbalance between the military and civilian elements of national power — a situation due as much to a disparity in au- thority as a disparity in resources. Guidelines for Consolidation In essence, I propose deconstructing State, then bring- ing in bureaucratic units from other agencies with related missions to the various bureaus and offices in the current flow chart. Each of these new entities — functional bu- reaus on steroids — would be organized around a major foreign relations theme: economic and trade relations, economic development, crisis response, public diplomacy and information, political-military engagement, migration F O C U S The most obvious and pressing area for consolidation is overseas economic development.