The Foreign Service Journal, May 2010

36 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A Y 2 0 1 0 and missions and shaping institu- tions to meet them. Heroically sim- plified, the argument has always been between those who support a Foreign Service designed to execute the classic diplomatic functions of reporting, representing and negoti- ating (the traditionalists); and those who espouse institutions designed to deal, as well, with the broader missions of economic development, public diplo- macy, stabilization and reconstruction, and so on (the ex- peditionaries). The evolution of the debate between the traditionalists and the expeditionaries, and the linkage of that debate to reform efforts, merit a brief summary. With the advent of the Cold War, a bevy of new gov- ernment-sponsored international missions arose: eco- nomic development, public diplomacy, arms control, permanent trade negotiations and many others. From the passage of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 until its suc- cessor, the Foreign Service Act of 1980, the traditionalists won the debate. The State Department and the Foreign Service continued to perform the ongoing diplomatic func- tions while the new missions were ceded or spun off to other agencies of government. “Reform” consisted of the creation of new U.S. inter- national agencies such as the United States Information Agency, the Agency for International Development (and its predecessors) and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. In addition, existing agencies (e.g., Agriculture, Commerce, Treasury and Justice) established or acquired their own micro-Foreign Service cadres, each supported by home offices in the respective agencies. This left the foreign affairs activities of the United States government fragmented, at least in Washington, among several competing, frequently quarrelsome agen- cies, each with their own agendas and congressional sup- porters. The “purity” of the diplomatic effort was main- tained, but at a cost. Two New Realities The terms and tenor of the traditionalist vs. expedi- tionary debate were changed dramatically and perma- nently by the Foreign Service Act of 1980. The authors of that legislation were, in turn, much influenced by two ex- ogenous and new realities. The first was the VietnamWar. That conflict may have been the first war to witness large- scale civilian involvement while combat was in progress. The Civil Operations and Revolutionary De- velopment Support nationbuilding effort there employed hundreds of Foreign Service officers from State and USAID in programs designed to defeat communist insurgency politically and economi- cally, as well as militarily. Nor were these efforts confined to Vietnam. Over time a strong plurality, if not a majority, of Foreign Service personnel shared similar experiences all over the Third World. The second factor was the need, well understood by the drafters of the 1980 act, to strengthen the hand of ambas- sadors endeavoring to forge unity of policy, purpose and message among foreign affairs agencies at each post in the face of policy fragmentation in Washington. Since 1961 every chief of mission had received a letter from the pres- ident instructing him or her to direct and coordinate all U.S. civilian and military personnel in the country of as- signment. The Foreign Service Act of 1980 established a clear statutory foundation for ambassadorial authority. Section 207 of Public Law 96-465 (Oct. 17, 1980) states that “the chief of mission to a foreign country shall have full re- sponsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervi- sion of all government employees in that country …” The operative word is direction . Ambassadors and, by extension, deputy chiefs of mis- sion are required by law to direct all government employ- ees, including those involved in the expeditionary activities of nationbuilding. That, in turn, means that the leaders of the Foreign Service and State Department need to acquire knowledge of, and preferably experience in, the expedi- tionary dimensions of modern diplomacy. The current phase of the debate began with the col- lapse of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990s. During the ensuing decade budgets for diplomacy, de- fense and development shrank by 30 percent. Defense and foreign affairs agencies paid for the “peace dividend” as the U.S. Information Agency and the Arms Control & Disarmament Agency were re-integrated into the State Department in 1999, and the U.S. Agency for Interna- tional Development withered. The remaining foreign affairs agencies did not have enough personnel to perform either traditional or expedi- F O C U S With the advent of the Cold War, a bevy of new government-sponsored international missions arose.