The Foreign Service Journal, May 2012

M A Y 2 0 1 2 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 17 ing reforms sparked by the Arab Spring will take years and perhaps decades to implement — and progress will be checkered if not stymied. In the Arab Spring countries themselves, the easy part may well prove to be the overthrow of the old regimes. The real challenge is the requirement for skilled political leadership to guide reforms and buy the patience of the public while they take effect. Elections so far have enfranchised Islamists in large num- bers, many of whom face the realities of governing for the first time. Tunisia has the best chance of effecting democratic and liberalizing economic reforms. It has had free and fair elec- tions in which moderate Islamists emerged as the largest bloc; its economic problems can be fixed with relatively small amounts of money with a prospective payoff not that far away; and its society has not been severely traumatized by Arab Spring events. Prospects for Bahrain may also be positive once it sorts out its governance issues, for the “pearl of the Gulf” has a relatively educated, cosmopolitan population whose skills are already competitive in the world market. It has begun the process of political reform, but it is hard to envision any lasting peace that does not involve even more substantial changes to give the Shia majority greater political and eco- nomic rights. Yet fears of Iranian inroads, as well as Sunni self-interest, constrain steps in that regard. Libya has the advantages of oil wealth and a small pop- ulation. But it suffers from a lack of institutional structure on which to build, complex tribal and regional rivalries, and the challenge of being a “post-conflict” state where the rev- olution has been bloody and destructive. Egypt has a large population (83 million), ethnic andmi- nority divisions, and no great oil income on which to rely. The bulk of the resources required to revive its economy, totaling hundreds of billions of dollars, must come from the Persian Gulf states and other governments that are not mo- tivated by promoting democracy. In addition, such funda- mental questions as the structure of government, the role of the military and security forces, the rights of minorities, and the relationship of Islam to the state are all unresolved. Islamist parties have a strong majority in the newly elected parliament and are testing their political sinews. Prospects are murky. Lacking both effective gover- nance and significant resources, Yemen may be best described as a failed state but not a failed society, because of its pattern of weak cen- tral government but strong tribal au- thority going back centuries. The Gulf Cooperation Council-negoti- ated transition offers hope for change, but the new government faces a host of daunting challenges: a predominantly youthful population with few prospects; dwindling natural resources; an incipient seces- sionmovement in the south; the on-again, off-againHouthi rebellion in the north; al-Qaeda; and a growing refugee in- flux from the failed state of Somalia. For all these reasons, Yemen’s prospects are grim. Beyond the Core Beyond the core Arab Spring countries, the predomi- nant pattern among the oil-rich GCC states is the use of largesse to facilitate incremental reforms without game- changing upsets. In Saudi Arabia, King Abdullah has de- creed programs to provide housing, jobs and other basic needs totaling $136 billion, and announced that women can participate in municipal elections and in the Majlas as- Shura (Consultative Council). While there may be a rapid change in the Saudi leadership in the next few years, the stability of the kingdomwill not be affected. A similar pat- tern applies to Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, as well. The United Nations has singled out Oman, where the Arab Spring found unexpected resonance, for praise as a model of economic development. Sultan Qaboos oversaw recent elections to the Omani Consultative Council, and has announced reforms underwritten in part by a GCC grant of $10 billion. In Algeria, another oil-rich state, memories of a robust Islamist uprising against the ruling autocracy in the 1990s have blunted the enthusiasm for regime change. The regime has put down protests and promised reform, but enough grievances remain that incremental reforms may not maintain the peace. Morocco and Jordan’s monarchs have instituted some political reforms in response to calls for a more democratic, accountable political system. Both countries suffer from high unemployment, large youth populations and scarce resources (particularly Jordan). Widespread discontent will F OCUS The need for these new governments to consider the popular will is likely to complicate U.S. diplomacy.