The Foreign Service Journal, May 2012

34 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A Y 2 0 1 2 changes necessary to prepare the country for the eventual exhaustion of its oil and gas resources or address the needs of its burgeoning youth. • Morocco . King Mohammed VI (hereafter M6) suc- cessfully traversed an immediate popular challenge to his authority via a deft constitutional reform that symboli- cally transferred more authority to parliament and dic- tated that the party with the most seats would be invited to form the government. The regime had initially dis- missed the rise of the Feb. 20 Movement, but it eventu- ally proved impossible to ignore. A disparate coalition of activists, principally students, organized demonstrations across Morocco to protest authoritarianism and the power of established interests and privilege among those belonging to or linked with the ruling elite (known as the makhzen). Although M6 reacted adroitly to defuse the movement through personal intervention, the nature of the regime remains largely unchanged. As much as the king is revered as a unifying national figure, the makhzen is feared and regarded by some as a force beyond his full control. Though he pushed hard for reform a decade ago, M6’s softer approach today suggests his priority on maintain- ing stability and continuity to ensure his young son’s even- tual succession. The constitutional amendment and subsequent parliamentary elections, which led to the Nov. 29 appointment of Morocco’s first Islamist prime minister, underscored the regime’s preference for coop- tation (which it alternates with persecution) of its oppo- nents over real change. Like other North African countries, Morocco’s so- cioeconomic situation is dire — epitomized by staggering inequality, significant illiteracy and limited opportunity. The expensive commitment to develop the disputed Western Sahara continues to be a huge drain on the treasury that no citizen can question. Rioting in northern Morocco in March was a reminder that constitutional reform alone cannot assuage decades of neglect and that the Western Sahara is not the only area under Moroccan control challenging Rabat’s con- tinued rule. The Islamist Justice and Development Party that leads Morocco’s current government — in coalition with the nationalist party that has dominated the country since independence — represents a break with the country’s political past. It enjoys a strong reputation for honesty given its previous opposition status. But the rival Islamist Justice and Charity movement, which rejects the legiti- macy of the monarchy and reportedly commands wide support, remains unlicensed, leaving its supporters in ef- fect disenfranchised. Much like Algeria, the bottom line for Morocco is that the regime is managing its immediate challenges, but un- derlying, unaddressed socioeconomic ills cloud the coun- try’s long-term future. What to Do? The advent of the Arab Spring last year gave the Maghreb greater saliency for U.S. policymakers. Most immediately, the risk posed by regional terrorism, per- petrated by al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and its allies throughout the trans-Sahara region, along with the pro- liferation of weapons coming out of Libya, demands a re- assessment of approaches. It also raises the question of how we can involve all regional stakeholders, including Europe, in countering this shared threat. There is no turning back the political transitions now in play. For decades, regimes suppressed, stalled or ma- nipulated the dynamics of generational change. This helped the Maghreb appear to be a relatively stable re- gion, despite mounting demographic and economic pres- sures. The fighting in Libya and Syria (assuming the endgame leads to a new regime there) represents the real risk to regimes that refuse to hear or respond to calls for reform. Algeria’s leaders, though they are the most re- sistant in the Maghreb, understand this, given their coun- try’s experience — even if their limited worldview prevents them from taking steps outside their comfort zone. History offers little reason to believe that the U.S. gov- ernment generally, or the Department of State in partic- ular, will accord the Maghreb the attention it deserves over the long term. The death of the U.S.-North African Economic Partnership after the Clinton administration is an object lesson North Africans have not forgotten. Nor do the Obama administration’s recent declarations about the need to shift attention to Asia and the prospect of tighter federal budgets bode well. The good news is that the Maghreb does not need a Marshall Plan. But it does need sustained engagement and attention. To facilitate this, it’s necessary to acknowledge that ex- isting bureaucratic structures at State and the White F OCUS