The Foreign Service Journal, May 2014

16 MAY 2014 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL Getting State and the Foreign Service Back in the Game Robert Hunter served as U.S. ambassador to NATO (1993-1998), lead consultant to the Na- tional Bipartisan Commission on Central America (also known as the Kissinger Commission, 1983-1984), director of West European and then Middle East affairs at the National Security Council (1977-1981) and foreign policy adviser to Senator Edward Kennedy (1973-1977), among other positions. He is currently a member of the State Department’s International Secu- rity Advisory Board and the American Academy of Diplomacy. F or some time, there has been a spate of articles and other com- mentary (I might even say hand- wringing) about the diminished role that the State Department is playing in the overall “making” of U.S. foreign policy, as opposed to “carrying out” at least the non-military elements of it. (Wit- ness Vali Nasr’s pointed analysis in The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat, Anchor, 2014.) Though I have never served in the U.S. Foreign Service, I would like to draw on my experience as a former ambassador to NATO and National Security Council staffer, and a current member of State’s International Security Advisory Board, to offer the following suggestions for getting State and the Foreign Service fully back in the game, where they belong. Strengthening the Foreign Service is essential in its own right, but I believe it is also critical to focus on the role that the State Department must play in the inter- agency process, as well as in developing (and implementing) overall strategies for the United States in the world. This is not just about diplomacy, either SPEAKING OUT This is not just about diplomacy, either narrowly or broadly defined, but about analyzing and integrating all instruments of power and influence— political, diplomatic, economic and military. BY ROBERT HUNTER narrowly or broadly defined, but about analyzing and integrating all instruments of power and influence—political, diplo- matic, economic and military. (And also cultural: I still bemoan one of the worst decisions affecting U.S. interests abroad in the last two decades, the elimination of the U.S. Information Agency, for which I spoke over many years and which should be promptly revived.) The Paradigm Gap This mission has become even more urgent since the end of the Cold War, with the collapse of a relatively simple unifying foreign policy paradigm. Indeed, there is now a “paradigm gap” that—absent a unifying “threat” from, say, China—will not be closed, given the nature of today’s diffuse international system and the likely systems of tomorrow. This reality is reinforced by the sheer scope of U.S. interaction with the outside world, encompassed (for want of a bet- ter term) by the concept “globalization.” Ironically, we face fewer direct threats to the homeland than we did during the Cold War, but are perforce far more engaged in the outside world than ever before, and must therefore be both smarter and more creative. Among other things, radical expan- sion of the term “foreign policy” means that there are a lot more players than ever before in U.S. policy formulation and engagement (not all of whom are in Washington), including the public and private sectors and nongovernmental organizations. These players all have an instantaneous capacity to interact and communicate that defies centralization under the authority of anyone, certainly including the Secretary of State—let alone any U.S. chief of mission abroad. The country teams in many embassies are already too huge to manage, forcing the front office to spend more and more time gathering intelligence on what is being done in the name of the U.S. by so many different actors—including combat- ant commands that bear no allegiance to the chief of mission. Back in Washington, State has often been sidelined since the end of the Cold War—not just because the White House has been drawing power to itself, but also because State has not sufficiently cultivated Foreign and Civil Service staff with the talents and skills to play effec- tive roles in strategic thinking and policy integration. These are not, alas, generally requirements for promotion. Killing off the mind-expanding Senior