The Foreign Service Journal, May 2014

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | MAY 2014 17 Seminar, on the specious grounds that senior people could not be spared for several months, is just one example of the problem. The same goes for the tendency often to send FSOs judged to be “unpro- motable” at State to be political advisers at military commands, even when they are “square pegs” who lack the regional or functional expertise to be effective there. This robs the commands of solid diplo- matic advice, deprives State of a source of seasoned intelligence on the U.S. military in action, and reduces the chances of inte- grating different aspects of policy. Left on the Margins While State continues to do its job well enough, often superbly, in terms of day-to-day activities (frequently under difficult circumstances), it has become steadily more marginal in the formulation of policy at the high end of the spectrum. This has been true of at least the last three administrations, and the resulting gap— though only in part State’s “fault”—has been largely filled by other entities. In particular, the National Security Council staff has grown exponentially since the end of the ColdWar, even though they, too, have often shown little penchant for “strategic thinking.”This is due in large part to the fact that every president after George H.W. Bush has seemed to believe, erroneously, that America’s role in the world is easier to manage in an era of reduced direct threats to the nation. (Also, the larger the NSC staff grows, the more it “crowds out” more experienced and expert people in the agencies.) The drop in the number of FSOs in senior-level positions at State—50 percent is the common assessment—is a further problem, not just for the department but also for policy-formulation overall. The intrusion of political appointees many layers deep into the bureaucracy, even down to the working level—lots of whom, let’s be candid, are not up to the job—only exacerbates the loss of Foreign Service expertise. This might have happened anyway, given the growth of patronage politics in recent decades. But it has not been helped by the relative lack of hard analyses and useful policy suggestions flowing from State to the White House, which could signal to the president that too much patronage politics at State could kill off a valuable goose and its golden eggs. And if the NSC staff itself proves to be inad- equate in strategic thinking, the president does not benefit if the pros at State don’t fill the gap. The Ideas Gap All too often, today’s Foreign Service does not encourage (or promote) mem- bers well-versed in strategic thought, broad-scale analysis and integration across regions and functions to pres- ent for presidential-level decision the perspectives and potentialities for U.S. effectiveness in the world. Too often, insight and initiative are stifled in the lower and middle grades; cutting-edge analysis is heavily sandpapered on the sixth and seventh floors, before smooth but uninspiring “consensus”—i.e., “fully cleared”—recommendations pass to the White House. Thus, expertise at State has made less of a dent in the interagency process and has been less on the “front lines” of ideas than should be expected. These lacunae in State’s policy leadership notably include, for instance, fashioning a new Transat- lantic Compact embracing NATO and the critical Transatlantic Trade and Invest- ment Partnership—on which Treasury and USTR have marginalized State; most areas of Middle East policy (including the necessary integration and trade-offs of contending aspects of U.S. interests and policies); charting courses to deal with the consequences of U.S. disentangling from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; and providing context and political content for the “rebalancing” to Asia. Another area, evident recently, in which the White House came up short and State did not fill the void, concerns NATO, Central Europe and Russia. Had circum- stances been properly understood and policies well-formulated and executed, clear-sightedness just might have headed off the recent crisis over Ukraine. It has been years, if not decades, since State’s Policy Planning staff has played the creative role for which it was designed. Too often, its director has lacked the skills, experience and stature to provide the necessary leadership in choosing and motivating staff and assur- ing that S/P’s products meet the needs of the Secretary of State. (To be fair, though, the Secretary has often failed to use S/P effectively or demand that it be “brought up to snuff.”) At the same time, many regional bureau assistant secretaries—even when Foreign Service and not political—are selected for their capacity to “manage” a bureau—which, of course, is important— but not to produce (or draw out from their teams) the perspectives needed for State to play a critical role in the formulation of policy. The under secretary for politi- cal affairs has often been top-class in this regard, but recent incumbents have rarely been chosen for their capacity for strategic thinking. Of course, there are pockets within the department that traditionally have played an effective “strategic” role and some continue to do so, notably, in my judg- ment, current Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Rose Gottemoeller and her able team. This is