The Foreign Service Journal, May 2014

18 MAY 2014 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL one area where State’s leadership role has long been acknowledged throughout the government. Filling the Leadership Vacuum Part of the problem is also insufficient leadership at the top of the department. To be blunt, several Secretaries of State in the past two decades never under- stood that their real influence derived from their ability to bring ideas to the table, not just success at implementing policy or sitting at the president’s right hand in the Cabinet or situation rooms. They compounded that mistake by defining success in terms of the narrow instrumentality summarized as “diplo- macy”—even when expertly carried out—without reference to strategic thinking, analysis, planning and presen- tation of policy alternatives. There has also been weakness at the top at the State Department in terms of fighting for money, including failure to enlist presidents in that cause. The first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Develop- ment Review four years ago was a noble venture in essaying a counterpart to the Defense Department’s Quadrennial Defense Review, thus opening the door to challenging DoD’s 13-to-1 share of the national security budget pie. But aside from some increase in the number of Foreign Service positions, what did the QDDR accomplish? The creation of three new bureaus just added to bureaucracy without enhancing State’s “clout”—whether in diplomacy and development or, more importantly, in strategy. Cast a Wide Net What is to be done? Addressing the problems and possibilities of the Foreign Service and of the State Department requires taking a broad look at the role of State in an age when more factors than ever before must be integrated to enable the United States to be effective in the world. It means placing added emphasis on developing people with the capac- ity for strategic thinking; and it means reforming the selection, promotion, organization and management processes within State, especially to emphasize and reward the skills and perspectives that produce ideas that can truly add value not just to the “interagency process” but also to securing U.S. interests and values abroad. Each Secretary of State needs to make building an effective, top-class, “strategically-oriented” team his or her first order of business before plunging into diplomacy. Otherwise, State’s role will continue to be depreciated, and the Foreign Service will increasingly be seen not as a policy development instrument but as a team of negotiators—however able. It follows, too, that strengthening State’s role in foreign policy and national security must include not just Foreign Service officers and others whose experi- ence is largely limited to the department, but their colleagues from other agencies, the private sector, NGOs and non-FSO “policymakers”—where strategic think- ing and integration of different perspec- tives and instruments of policy and action will also be in critical demand. Of course, all of this must be directed from the top, by U.S. presidents who understand the need for a first-class team in foreign policy and national secu- rity, structure and organization to enable them to be effective and his or her com- mitment to lead. This, too, is needed for State and the Foreign Service to get back in the game. n