The Foreign Service Journal, May 2015

28 MAY 2015 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL v Form a Seamless Partnership with the RSO Consulate General Karachi’s security team was an integral part of everything we did. Our success would not have been possible without the unity of vision and purpose that I shared with my regional security officers, in particular. I was lucky to have enough RSO staff, but also the right people. They looked for every opportunity to say “yes,” even when saying “no” would have been easier. And they shared my commitment to customer service and commu- nication. But beyond resting on the comfort of having strong RSO staff, we made sure that we care- fully managed post-Benghazi security requirements by: ■ Looping in the RSO. Every trip, visit and engagement required advance planning, and someone from the RSO shop was always present from the start, so there were no surprises. ■ Running effective EAC meetings . As you might imagine, our Emergency Action Committee met very often. Before each session, the RSO and I conferred to set the agenda for the meeting, focusing on the messages Washington needed to hear coming out of it. This kept the gatherings efficient and made them as useful as possible. v Coordinate Closely with Washington The most important thing I learned frommy two years leading Consulate General Karachi is this: Successful diplomacy in a high- threat post depends on understanding Washington—and, for a constituent post, the embassy as well. There is no use complaining about the “10,000-mile screw- driver.” Today’s technology guarantees that no overseas post will ever operate with the sense of autonomy and distance from the flagpole that we once did. The key to managing and succeeding is constantly taking the pulse of Washington, and anticipating information demands— both to avoid surprises and (hopefully) head off directives you disagree with. I thought I had done a good job meet- ing the key Washington players during consultations before I went to post. But events in September 2012 and later, particularly the spring 2014 attack on Karachi Airport, made me realize I hadn’t even scratched the surface in terms of everyone who had a say in operations at my post. Success in navigating the shifting waters of Washington, par- ticularly from a constituent post, required: ■ Regular and open communication with the desk; ■ Understanding the State Department and interagency decision points, and the impor- tance of EAC cables and other channels of communication; ■ Earning the trust of Wash- ington decision-makers; and ■ Building and maintaining a close partnership with the embassy front office and coun- try team, including spending a few days every month in the capital. Success Is Possible The robust diplomacy we carried out in Karachi used all the tools at our disposal. Our team developed political and civil society contacts, promoted U.S. business interests and our core development objectives, facilitated legitimate travel to the United States, and touched countless lives through education programs, social media and even televised cooking shows. The tragic events of September 2012 altered our operating environment, just as emerging local and global threats did. These often affected what we could do from day to day, but they didn’t stop us from doing our job. Nor, I believe, did they appreciably limit the impact of our work. The main lesson I took away frommy time in Karachi was that, even in the post-Benghazi era, U.S. diplomats can success- fully engage in high-threat environments—if they have the right resources, foster a strong and unified team, and understand Washington. n Every movement an American staff member made in Karachi was planned in advance. PUBLIC AFFAIRS/CONSULATE GENERAL KARACHI CG Dodman enjoying a performance by Sufi musicians during a visit to northern Sindh province, February 2013.